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“Kill the Sea Turtles” and Other Things 
You Can’t Make the Government Say 
Scott W. Gaylord* 
Abstract 
In Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, the Supreme Court 
confirmed that there is no heckler’s veto under the government 
speech doctrine. When speaking, the government has the right to 
speak for itself and to select the views that it wants to express. But 
the Court acknowledged that sometimes it is difficult to determine 
whether the government is actually speaking. Specialty license 
plates have proven to be one of those difficult situations, raising 
novel and important First Amendment issues. Six circuits have 
reached four separate conclusions regarding the status of 
messages on specialty license plates. Three circuits have held that 
specialty plates are private speech, one has held that specialty 
plates are government speech, and another has held that specialty 
plates are hybrid speech. Yet another circuit has held that the 
issue is nonjusticiable under the Tax Injunction Act. And the 
uncertainty continues as North Carolina, Texas, and Oklahoma 
currently confront litigation over their license plates—litigation 
that will determine whether states or third parties have the right 
to select the messages on specialty license plates.  
This Article explores the Court’s “recently minted” government 
speech doctrine in the context of specialty plates. In particular, it 
analyzes the circumstances under which a state can adopt one 
message (“Save the Sea Turtles”) while refusing to authorize 
opposing viewpoints (“Kill the Sea Turtles”). To date, the majority 
of circuits have applied a literal speaker test, which looks to see if 
a reasonable observer would view specialty plates as government 
or private speech. Under that test, specialty plates are private 
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speech, and any restrictions on the content of such plates must be 
reasonable and viewpoint neutral, even if a state disagrees with 
that message.  
This Article contends that a careful review of Summum, 
which was decided after all but one of the circuit court decisions, 
shows that the majority interpretation is wrong. The literal 
speaker test is inconsistent with the “control” test set out in 
Summum and Johanns. Under the Court’s new test for 
government speech, many specialty license plate programs are 
government speech, and third parties cannot force states to 
promulgate messages with which they disagree. If a state has a 
“Save the Sea Turtles” plate to promote conservation and the 
protection of its wildlife, it cannot be forced to offer a “Kill the Sea 
Turtles” plate. And the same holds true for more controversial 
messages such as “Choose Life” in North Carolina as well as 
Texas’s ban on plates containing divisive images such as a 
Confederate flag. Thus, this Article concludes that Summum 
marks a significant development in the Court’s free speech 
jurisprudence, one that affirms the states’ ability to control the 
messages on their specialty license plates as well as their other 
expressive activity. 
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I. Introduction 
Sometimes important First Amendment issues hide in plain 
sight. Such is the case with specialty license plates. We see them 
all the time: “special” messages on license plates that celebrate 
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various organizations and causes, including the military, the 
environment, professional sports, education, civic groups, 
recreational activities, historical events, and other interesting 
(and sometimes novel) things associated with a state.1 But who 
has control over the content of these specialty license plates? Do 
states get to decide what messages go on these plates or do 
nongovernmental actors dictate the content? If a state has a 
“Save the Sea Turtles” plate, must it allow a “Kill the Sea 
Turtles” plate to avoid discriminating based on viewpoint? Or, 
with respect to more controversial and socially divisive issues, 
must all of the states with a “Choose Life” plate also offer a 
“Respect Choice” plate? Must Texas authorize a “Sons of 
Confederate Veterans” plate, which includes a Confederate flag, if 
the group petitions for one? 
As it turns out, the answers to these questions involve 
important—and highly contested—issues of First Amendment 
law. These questions have confounded the lower courts, leading to 
a four-way split among six circuits,2 and challenges are ongoing 
in North Carolina,3 Texas,4 and Oklahoma.5 The only thing that 
                                                                                                     
 1. Each of the 50 states, as well as the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, 
and the U.S. Virgin Islands, has specialty license plate programs. License Plate 
Information, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/ 
transportation/license-plate-information.aspx (last updated July 2011) (last 
visited Jan. 12, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
Although the number of specialty plates offered varies by jurisdiction, currently 
there are more than 4,600 specialty plates available across the country, and the 
number appears likely to continue to increase. Id. 
 2. See Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 871 (8th Cir. 2009) (invalidating a 
specialty license plate program under the First Amendment); Ariz. Life Coal. 
Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 973 (9th Cir. 2008) (same); Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. 
White, 547 F.3d 853, 867 (7th Cir. 2008) (same); Sons of Confederate Veterans, 
Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 629 (4th Cir. 
2002) (same). But see ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 380 (6th Cir. 
2006) (upholding a specialty license plate program under the First Amendment); 
Henderson v. Stalder, 407 F.3d 351, 360 (5th Cir. 2005) (dismissing the 
challenge for lack of jurisdiction under the Tax Injunction Act).  
 3. See ACLU of N.C. v. Conti, 835 F. Supp. 2d 51, 62–63 (E.D.N.C. 2011) 
(challenging North Carolina’s “Choose Life” license plate). 
 4. See Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Vandergriff, No. A-11-CA-
1049-SS, 2013 WL 1562758, at *26 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 12, 2013) (seeking a court 
order to force Texas to provide a license plate with a confederate flag to 
members of the Sons of Confederate Veterans). 
 5. See Cressman v. Thompson, 719 F.3d 1139, 1140–41 (10th Cir. 2013) 
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the circuit courts have agreed on is that the government’s ability 
to control the message on its specialty plates depends on whether 
the plates are government speech or private speech.6 This 
determination is dispositive because “[t]he Free Speech Clause 
restricts government regulation of private speech; it does not 
regulate government speech.”7  
Under the Court’s “recently minted”8 government speech 
doctrine, the government has the right to “speak for itself”9 and 
“to select the views that it wants to express.”10 As a speaker, the 
government can discriminate based on content and even 
viewpoint11 “to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor 
distorted.”12 In the specialty license plate context, this means that 
when speaking a state can issue a “Save the Sea Turtles” plate 
                                                                                                     
(challenging an Oklahoma statute that prevented the plaintiff from covering an 
image on his license plate depicting a Native American shooting an arrow 
toward the sky). 
 6. See, e.g., Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 2009) (“To 
determine whether Missouri’s specialty license plate scheme survives a First 
Amendment challenge, we must first decide whether the messages contained on 
specialty plates communicate government or private speech.”); Ariz. Life Coal. 
Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 963 (9th Cir. 2008) (“We must decide whether, by 
authorizing a specialty license plate . . . the State of Arizona has adopted that 
speech as its own.”); Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va. 
Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 616 (4th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e turn first to the 
question of whether the speech on the special plates authorized by the Virginia 
legislature is private speech or ‘government speech.’”).  
 7. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009). 
 8. Id. at 481 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 9. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 
229 (2000). 
 10. Summum, 555 U.S. at 460. 
 11. See, e.g., Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598 
(1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It is the very business of government to favor 
and disfavor points of view . . . .”); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991) 
(arguing that if the government violated the Constitution when it chose to fund 
a program that advances certain goals to the detriment of other goals, then 
numerous government programs would be unconstitutional); Sons of 
Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 288 
F.3d 610, 618 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Thus, even ordinarily impermissible viewpoint-
based distinctions drawn by the government may be sustained where the 
government itself speaks or where it uses private speakers to transmit its 
message.”). 
 12. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 
(1995). 
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without offering a plate advocating for the opposite—“Kill the Sea 
Turtles.” And the constitutional analysis is the same for more 
socially and politically charged topics such as “Choose Life” or 
“Respect Choice.” 
Of course, the opposite is true if the government is regulating 
private speech in a forum: “In the realm of private speech or 
expression, government regulation may not favor one speaker 
over another.”13 If a state’s specialty plate program creates a 
forum for private speech, then the government is limited in its 
ability to restrict the speakers who may participate in the forum:  
When the State establishes a limited public forum, the State is 
not required to and does not allow persons to engage in every 
type of speech. The State may be justified “in reserving [its 
forum] for certain groups or for the discussion of certain 
topics.” The State’s power to restrict speech, however, is not 
without limits. The restriction must not discriminate against 
speech on the basis of viewpoint, and the restriction must be 
“reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum.”14 
Any restriction on private speech in the forum must be, at a 
minimum, viewpoint neutral and “reasonable in light of the 
purpose served by the forum.”15 Consequently, if a state allows a 
license plate on a given topic, it must permit all viewpoints on 
that issue—whether the plates involve sea turtles, abortion, the 
military or any other topic.16  
As the Court acknowledged in Pleasant Grove City v. 
Summum,17 though, “there may be situations in which it is 
difficult to tell whether a government entity is speaking on its 
own behalf or is providing a forum for private speech.”18 Specialty 
license plates have proven to be one of those situations. Six 
                                                                                                     
 13. Id. at 828. 
 14. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106–07 (2001) 
(citations omitted). 
 15. Id. at 107. 
 16. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829–30 (explaining that there is “a distinction 
between . . . content discrimination, which may be permissible if it preserves the 
purposes of th[e] limited forum, and . . . viewpoint discrimination, which is 
presumed impermissible when directed against speech otherwise within the 
forum’s limitations”). 
 17. 555 U.S. 460 (2009). 
 18. Id. at 470. 
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circuit courts have reached four different conclusions regarding 
the status of messages on specialty license plates.19 The Seventh, 
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits consider specialty license plates to be 
(primarily) private speech, offering drivers an opportunity to 
promote a group or cause with which they agree.20 The Fourth 
Circuit views specialty plates as hybrid speech, involving both 
government speech and private expression.21 In contrast, the 
Sixth Circuit holds that these plates are government speech, 
which means that the government can make viewpoint-based 
distinctions and allow a “Choose Life” plate while rejecting a 
“Respect Choice” plate.22 The Fifth Circuit contends that the Tax 
Injunction Act23 (TIA) divests the federal courts of jurisdiction 
over challenges to specialty plate programs because the extra 
charge for specialty plates constitutes a tax for TIA purposes.24  
The First Amendment analysis is made all the more difficult 
because all but one of these circuit court cases were decided 
before the Supreme Court’s decision in Summum,25 which set out 
                                                                                                     
 19. Supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 20. See, e.g., Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 867 (8th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e now 
join the Fourth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits in concluding that a reasonable and 
fully informed observer would consider the speaker to be the organization that 
sponsors and the vehicle owner who displays the specialty license plate.”). 
 21. See Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 794 (4th Cir. 
2004) (“[T]he speech here appears to be neither purely government speech nor 
purely private speech, but a mixture of the two.”); id. at 800 (Luttig, J., 
concurring) (“I am pleased that the court adopts today the view that speech can 
indeed be hybrid in character.”). 
 22. See ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 376 (6th Cir. 2006) (“As 
in Johanns, here Tennessee ‘sets the overall message to be communicated and 
approves every word that is disseminated’ on the ‘Choose Life’ plate. It is 
Tennessee’s own message.”). 
 23. Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012). 
 24. See Henderson v. Stalder, 407 F.3d 351, 359 (5th Cir. 2005) (“To fulfill 
the purposes of the Tax Injunction Act, and because the specialty plate charges 
cannot under these facts constitute regulatory fees, we are persuaded that the 
additional charges for specialty plates must be characterized as taxes.”). 
 25. Not surprisingly, much of the commentary regarding specialty license 
plates also predates Summum. See, e.g., Traci Daffer, A License to Choose or a 
Plate-ful of Controversy? Analysis of the “Choose Life” Plate Debate, 75 UMKC L. 
REV. 869 (2007); Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying 
Expression’s Source, 88 B.U. L. REV. 587 (2008); Caroline M. Corbin, Mixed 
Speech: When Speech is Both Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605 
(2008); Jeremy T. Berry, Comment, Licensing A Choice: “Choose Life” Specialty 
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the Court’s most recent and most thorough explanation of the 
government speech doctrine.26 Under Summum’s “recently 
minted” government speech doctrine, governmental control over 
the expressive activity is the touchstone for government speech.27 
States may speak through their specialty license plates and reject 
unwanted messages if they exercise the requisite authority over 
their specialty plate programs.28 
The circuits reaching the opposite conclusion have adopted a 
“literal speaker” test, which focuses on “one key question: 
whether, under all the circumstances, a reasonable and fully 
informed observer would consider the speaker to be the 
government or a private party.”29 Under this test, a state loses 
the right “to select the views that it wants to express”30 because 
vehicle owners—who reasonable observers think are sending the 
message—can force it to authorize specialty plates (“Kill the Sea 
Turtles” or “Respect Choice”) that directly contradict its intended 
message.31 Consequently, the literal speaker test is inapplicable 
in the specialty plate context because it requires states either to 
accept a proliferation of unwanted messages or to close the 
alleged specialty plate forums.32 Summum, though, demonstrates 
                                                                                                     
License Plates and Their Constitutional Implications, 51 EMORY L.J. 1605, 1624–
30 (2002); Jack Guggenheim & Jed Silversmith, Confederate License Plates at 
the Constitutional Crossroads: Vanity Plates, Special Registration Organization 
Plates, Bumper Stickers, Viewpoints, Vulgarity, and the First Amendment, 54 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 563, 577–79 (2000). 
 26. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009) (ruling 
that the placement of permanent monuments in a public park is government 
speech and therefore not analyzed under strict scrutiny). 
 27. See id. at 472–73 (finding that monuments in a city-run park 
constituted government speech because the city exercised complete control in 
selecting the content of the monuments). 
 28. See id. (allowing a city to select the content of monuments in a city-run 
park because doing so constitutes government speech). 
 29. Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 867 (8th Cir. 2009); see also Choose 
Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 863–64 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that the 
most obvious speakers in the specialty license plates context are the vehicle 
owners and the sponsoring organizations). 
 30. Summum, 555 U.S. at 468. 
 31. See White, 547 F.3d at 863–64 (stating that the vehicle owners are the 
most obvious speakers in the specialty license plate context). 
 32. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 557, 
576 (1995) (“[W]hen dissemination of a view contrary to one’s own is forced upon 
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that the literal speaker test puts states in such an untenable 
position that “‘public forum principles . . . are out of place in the 
context of this case.’”33 Pursuant to the government speech 
doctrine, states that retain “effective control” over their specialty 
plate programs cannot be forced to promote “Kill the Sea Turtles” 
or any other message with which they disagree. Instead, these 
states can claim the “fundamental rule of protection under the 
First Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the 
content of his own message.”34  
Contrary to the majority view among circuit courts,35 these 
states can allow specialty plates on mundane and even 
controversial topics without providing for alternative viewpoints. 
To demonstrate why this is the case, Part II of this Article sets 
out the split among the circuit courts, exploring the differences 
between and among the decisions by the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, 
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, and analyzes the government speech 
                                                                                                     
a speaker intimately connected with the communication advanced, the speaker’s 
right to autonomy over the message is compromised.”). 
 33. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 478 (2009) (quoting 
United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 205 (2003)). 
 34. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573. 
 35. The majority of circuits follow the “literal speaker” test. See Roach v. 
Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 867 (8th Cir. 2009) (finding that specialty license plates 
are private speech). This approach bears “one key question: whether, under all 
the circumstances, the reasonable and fully informed observer would consider 
the speaker to be the government or a private party.” Id. at 867. In answering 
this question, the courts look at four factors: the purpose of the program; the 
degree of editorial control exercised by the state; the identity of the literal 
speaker; and whether the state or the private speaker bears the ultimate 
responsibility for the message. See Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r 
of the Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 618 (4th Cir. 2002) 
(invalidating a specialty license plate program). In Roach, the court applied 
these four factors and joined the Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits in 
concluding that the “reasonable and fully informed observer would consider the 
speaker to be the organization that sponsors or the vehicle owner who displays 
the specialty license plate.” Roach, 560 F.3d at 867; see also Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. 
v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 960 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that specialty license 
plates constitute “primarily private speech” under the literal speaker test); 
Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 863 (7th Cir. 2008) (concluding that 
under the literal speaker test, “[m]essages on specialty license plates cannot be 
characterized as the government’s speech”); Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. 
Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 793 (4th Cir. 2004) (concluding that specialty license plates 
constitute a mixture of government and private speech under the literal speaker 
test). 
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doctrine as developed in Summum.36 Part III explains why 
Summum’s control test for government speech is inconsistent 
with the literal speaker test that the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, 
and Ninth Circuits employ.37 The literal speaker test focuses on 
the wrong person in the communicative process—the viewer 
instead of the government speaker—and, in the process, ignores 
the Court’s finding that the government’s intended meaning may 
be interpreted differently by different observers. Moreover, 
contrary to the suggestion of several circuit courts, the Court’s 
decision in Wooley v. Maynard38 does not support a finding that 
specialty plates are government speech.39 Finally, Part IV 
demonstrates why, in light of Summum, the Court’s forum 
doctrine applies neither to monuments nor specialty license 
plates.40 As a result, states retain their First Amendment rights 
as speakers to control their messages without having to permit 
other groups to advance inconsistent or undesired messages on 
the governments’ property. 
II. An Overview of the Government Speech–Private Speech Divide: 
Summum and the Split Among Circuit Courts 
The complexity of the First Amendment issues implicated by 
specialty license plates garnered national attention in the early 
2000s as states began issuing controversial plates, such as 
“Choose Life.”41 In the wake of Planned Parenthood of 
                                                                                                     
 36. Infra Part II. 
 37. Infra Part III. 
 38. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).  
 39. See id. at 716–17 (prohibiting New Hampshire from prosecuting 
criminally individuals who, due to their moral and religious beliefs, cover the 
motto “Live Free or Die” on their license plates). 
 40. Infra Part IV. 
 41. “Choose Life” license plates were not the only controversial specialty 
plates that fostered legal challenges. See, e.g., Sons of Confederate Veterans, 
Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 610 (4th Cir. 
2002) (dealing with a proposed Confederate flag license plate). As discussed 
below, one of the first challenges involved Virginia’s denial of a specialty plate to 
the Sons of Confederate Veterans, which proposed a plate that included a 
Confederate flag as part of the design. Id.  
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Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,42 states sought to regulate 
abortion in a variety of ways, from banning partial birth 
abortions43 to promoting childbirth through “Choose Life” license 
plates.44 These “Choose Life” plates spawned litigation across the 
country,45 and the federal courts were deeply divided as to how 
these challenges should be handled under the First 
Amendment.46 Lacking Supreme Court guidance, several circuits 
borrowed from the Court’s reasonable observer test in 
Establishment Clause cases47 and developed a literal speaker test 
for government speech—whether a reasonable observer would 
view the specialty plates as government or private speech.48 None 
of these cases, however, applied the Court’s most recent 
government speech case, Summum.  
The challenges to specialty plates continue today, with 
litigation ongoing in the Fourth Circuit regarding North 
Carolina’s “Choose Life” plate,49 Texas’s rejection of a Sons of 
                                                                                                     
 42. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Casey challenged a Pennsylvania law that imposed 
various restrictions on receiving an abortion. Id. at 844–45. These restrictions 
include informed consent, a twenty-four hour waiting period, spousal 
notification, and reporting requirements. Id. at 881–900.  
 43. See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 917–18 (2000) (invalidating 
Nebraska’s partial birth abortion ban); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 
(2007) (validating a federal ban on partial birth abortions). 
 44. See, e.g., Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 855 (7th Cir. 
2008) (stating that over 25,000 residents of Illinois joined a petition to create a 
“Choose Life” license plate). 
 45. See, e.g., Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 960 (9th Cir. 
2008) (challenging a “Choose Life” license plate); Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 
860, 862–63 (8th Cir. 2009) (same); White, 547 F.3d at 855 (same). 
 46. Compare White, 547 F.3d at 853 (invalidating a “Choose Life” license 
plate), with ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 376 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(upholding a “Choose Life” license plate). 
 47. See Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 620 
(1989) (stating that the constitutionality of government actions challenged 
under the Establishment Clause should be “judged according to the standard of 
a ‘reasonable observer’” (citation omitted)). 
 48. See Roach, 560 F.3d at 867 (concluding that the reasonable observer of 
a specialty license plate would consider the speaker to be the sponsoring 
organization and the vehicle owner). 
 49. See generally ACLU of N.C. v. Conti, 835 F. Supp. 2d 51 (E.D.N.C. 
2011). 
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Confederate Veterans plate,50 and Oklahoma’s standard issue 
plate that includes an image related to a Native American 
religion.51 These current cases, though, are being litigated against 
a First Amendment landscape that has changed dramatically 
with Summum’s advancement of a new standard for government 
speech.52 As discussed below, this standard undermines the 
literal speaker test that the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth 
Circuits previously applied to specialty license plates.53 
Consequently, Summum sets the stage for a new wave of 
litigation regarding the ability of states to promote preferred 
messages through their specialty plate programs.  
A. The Circuit Split 
Given the lack of guidance from the Supreme Court and the 
complexity of the First Amendment issues involved, courts 
understandably have struggled with the constitutionality of 
specialty plates. While the courts are divided as to the proper 
constitutional standard for specialty plates,54 they agree on one 
thing—that the critical question is whether specialty plates are 
government speech.55 Prior to the wave of “Choose Life” license 
                                                                                                     
 50. See Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Vandergriff, No. A-11-CA-
1049-SS, 2013 WL 1562758, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 12, 2013) (seeking a court 
order to force the State of Texas to provide a license plate with a Confederate 
flag to members of the Sons of Confederate Veterans). 
 51. See Cressman v. Thompson, 719 F.3d 1139, 1141–42 (10th Cir. 2013) 
(challenging an Oklahoma statute that prevented the plaintiff from covering on 
his license plate an image of a Native American shooting an arrow toward the 
sky). 
 52. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 472–73 (2009) (finding 
that monuments in a public park constitute government speech because the 
municipality controls the messages sent by the monuments). 
 53. Supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 54. Compare ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 376 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(finding that Tennessee’s specialty license plate was government speech because 
Tennessee effectively controlled the messages delivered by the license plates), 
with Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 868 (8th Cir. 2009) (stating that the 
determinative factor in these cases is whether the reasonable observer would 
conclude that the government is speaking). 
 55. See, e.g., Roach, 560 F.3d at 863 (“To determine whether Missouri’s 
specialty license plate scheme survives a First Amendment challenge, we must 
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plate cases, the Supreme Court had indicated in cases like Rust v. 
Sullivan56 and Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin 
System v. Southworth57 that the government had the right to 
speak for itself.58 The Court, however, did not provide a detailed 
explanation of the government speech doctrine.59 That changed in 
2009 when the Court decided Summum. After Summum, to 
determine whether specialty plates are government or private 
speech, courts first must discern whether the literal speaker test 
or Summum’s control test governs that determination.60 A careful 
review of Summum and Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n61 
reveals that the control test provides a new standard, one that is 
incompatible with the literal speaker test. 
                                                                                                     
first decide whether the messages contained on specialty plates communicate 
government or private speech.”); Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 
963 (9th Cir. 2008) (“We must decide whether, by authorizing a specialty license 
plate . . . the State of Arizona has adopted that speech as its own.”); Sons of 
Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 288 
F.3d 610, 616 (4th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e turn first to the question of whether the 
speech on the special plates authorized by the Virginia legislature is private 
speech or ‘government speech.’”). 
 56. 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
 57. 529 U.S. 217 (2000). 
 58. See id. at 235 (explaining that when the government speaks “it is, in 
the end, accountable to the electorate and the political process for its advocacy”); 
Legal Servs. Corp. v. Valezquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (explaining that while 
“[t]he Court in Rust did not place explicit reliance on the rationale that the 
counseling activities of the doctors . . . amounted to government speech[,] when 
interpreting the holding in later cases, . . . we have explained Rust on this 
understanding”). 
 59. See Legal Servs. Corp., 531 U.S. at 541 (invalidating under the First 
Amendment a federal statute that prohibited the Legal Services Corporation 
from providing funding to public interest legal organizations that challenge or 
attempt to amend existing welfare law). 
 60. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009) (stating 
that the parties “disagree sharply about the line of precedents” that applies in 
determining whether the government is speaking). 
 61. 544 U.S. 550 (2005).  
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1. The Fourth and Ninth Circuits’ Four-Factor Test: Specialty 
Plates as Private Speech or Hybrid Speech 
The Fourth Circuit was the first circuit to consider the 
constitutionality of restrictions on specialty license plates.62 The 
court was asked to decide whether Virginia could deny a specialty 
plate because of a Confederate flag that was incorporated into the 
proposed design of the plate.63 Pursuant to a Virginia statute, the 
Sons of Confederate Veterans (SCV), a nonprofit organization, 
applied for a specialty license plate.64 The proposed plate would 
bear the group’s name and its emblem, which included a 
Confederate flag.65 The Commonwealth of Virginia granted SCV’s 
application for an organizational specialty plate but only with 
what was, from the SCV’s perspective, a significant 
modification—the SCV could not include its emblem on the 
plate.66 SCV filed suit, claiming that Virginia violated its First 
Amendment rights by restricting its expression in a forum that 
was generally open to all organizations that met the statutory 
requirements, which SCV did (as evidenced by Virginia’s issuing 
a modified form of its specialty plate).67 
The Fourth Circuit recognized the novelty of SCV’s First 
Amendment claim as well as the important threshold question it 
raised: “No clear standard has yet been enunciated in our circuit 
or by the Supreme Court for determining when the government is 
‘speaking’ and thus able to draw viewpoint-based distinctions, 
and when it is regulating private speech and thus unable to do 
so.”68 Lacking direct guidance, the Fourth Circuit adopted a four-
                                                                                                     
 62. See Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of 
Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 610 (4th Cir. 2002) (invalidating Virginia’s 
specialty license plate program under the First Amendment). 
 63. Id. at 613–14. 
 64. Id. at 613. 
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. Unlike other statutes that authorized specialty plates, the statute 
approving an SCV plate precluded SCV from including its emblem on the plate. 
See VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-746.22 (West 2013) (“No logo or emblem of any 
description shall be displayed or incorporated into the design of license plates 
issued under this section.”). 
 67. Sons of Confederate Veterans, 288 F. 3d at 614. 
 68. Id. at 618. 
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factor test that other circuits had developed in other First 
Amendment contexts.69 Under the SCV test, courts resolve 
whether specialty plates are government speech or private speech 
by considering  
(1) the central “purpose” of the program in which the speech in 
question occurs; (2) the degree of “ editorial control” exercised 
by the government or private entities over the content of 
the speech; (3) the identity of the “ literal speaker”; and 
(4) whether the government or the private entity bears the 
“ultimate responsibility” for the content of the speech.70  
Applying these factors, the SCV court concluded that specialty 
plates were private speech in a designated specialty license plate 
forum.71 Virginia had created its specialty plate forum to raise 
money and to permit groups to promulgate their own messages.72 
The organizations had control over the design of the plates.73 
Drawing on Wooley, the court concluded that the driver was the 
literal speaker and bore ultimate responsibility for the message: 
“[T]he special plates are mounted on vehicles owned by private 
persons, and the Supreme Court has indicated that license plates, 
                                                                                                     
 69. See Wells v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1141 (10th Cir. 
2001) (applying the four-factor test in determining whether a sign listing the 
private sponsors of a public holiday display constituted government speech); 
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085, 
1093–95 (8th Cir. 2000) (considering similar factors to resolve whether 
announcements of sponsors’ names and short messages from sponsors on a 
public radio station were government speech); Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 
228 F.3d 1003, 1011 (9th Cir. 2000) (using the same reasoning to decide whether 
postings to school bulletin boards were government speech or private speech). 
 70. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of Motor 
Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 618 (4th Cir. 2002).  
 71. Id. at 614. See also Berry, supra note 25, at 1624–30 (stating that 
specialty plates create a designated public forum because “the ‘Choose Life’ 
plates involve an intentional effort by the states to open a nonpublic forum, the 
standard state license plate”); Guggenheim & Silversmith, supra note 25, at 
577–79 (contending that specialty plates create a designated or limited public 
forum while vanity plates are a nonpublic forum). 
 72. See Sons of Confederate Veterans, 288 F.3d at 620 (“If the General 
Assembly intends to speak, it is curious that it requires the guaranteed 
collection of a designated amount of money from private persons before its 
‘speech’ is triggered.”). 
 73. See id. at 614 (stating that designing a specialty plate is a collaborative 
process—the organization proposes the design and the state approves it). 
108 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 93 (2014) 
even when owned by the government, implicate private speech 
interests because of the connection of any message on the plate to 
the driver or owner of the vehicle.”74 As a result, Virginia’s 
precluding of SCV’s emblem constituted impermissible viewpoint 
discrimination.75 
In Planned Parenthood of South Carolina v. Rose,76 the 
Fourth Circuit once again was called on to decide the 
constitutionality of a state’s specialty license plate program.77 The 
South Carolina legislature, at the behest of two state legislators, 
approved a “Choose Life” specialty plate but not a corresponding 
pro-choice plate.78 Planned Parenthood of South Carolina sued, 
claiming that South Carolina’s specialty plate program favored a 
specific viewpoint on abortion (“Choose Life”) and, consequently, 
discriminated against other viewpoints (such as “Respect 
Choice”).79 The panel employed the four-factor test articulated in 
SCV and reached a similar conclusion—that the state engaged in 
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.80 Yet the Rose panel’s 
reasoning differed significantly from the analysis in SCV. Instead 
of finding that the plates were private speech, the court, with 
each member of the panel writing a separate opinion, determined 
that South Carolina’s “Choose Life” plate “embodie[d] a mixture 
of private and government speech.”81  
Judge Michael, who wrote the most detailed opinion, 
distinguished SCV on the grounds that the “Choose Life” plate 
was initiated by state legislators, not a private organization like 
SCV.82 As a result, “the purpose of the Choose Life Act is 
                                                                                                     
 74. Id. at 621 (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977)). 
 75. Id. at 626–27. 
 76. 361 F.3d 786 (4th Cir. 2004).  
 77. See id. at 795–800 (finding that South Carolina’s “Choose Life” license 
plate constituted viewpoint discrimination). 
 78. Id. at 788. 
 79. Id. at 793. 
 80. Id. at 793–94. 
 81. Id. at 793; see also L. Gielow Jacobs, Who’s Talking? Disentangling 
Government and Private Speech, 36 UNIV. OF MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 97 (2002) 
(contending that specialty plates contain “a mixture of government and private 
speech”). 
 82. Planned Parenthood of S.C. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 793 (4th Cir. 2004).  
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specifically to promote the expression of a pro-life viewpoint,” not 
simply the message of a private group.83 Unlike Virginia’s 
specialty plate program, the South Carolina legislature “exercises 
complete editorial control over the content of the speech on the 
Choose Life plate.”84 The first two factors, therefore, favored 
government speech, while the second two—the literal speaker 
and ultimate responsibility—still weighed in favor of private 
speech.85 Accordingly, the “Choose Life” plate constituted hybrid 
speech: “Therefore, the speech here appears to be neither purely 
government speech nor purely private speech, but a mixture of 
the two.”86  
SCV did not involve and consequently did not consider what 
standard applies when the message on a government-owned 
license plate implicates both government and private speech.87 
Confronted with this indeterminate result, the Rose panel relied 
on the Supreme Court’s forum analysis, considering whether the 
government opened a forum and, if so, whether it could engage in 
viewpoint discrimination in that forum.88 Although writing in 
separate opinions, the panel agreed that, having created a forum 
for private expression, South Carolina could neither “giv[e] its 
own viewpoint privilege above others” in that forum nor 
“authorize cloaked advocacy that allows the State to promote an 
idea without being accountable to the political process.”89 Those 
who viewed the “Choose Life” plate would not think that the 
                                                                                                     
 83. Id.  
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. at 793–94. 
 86. Id. at 794. 
 87. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of Motor 
Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 621 (4th Cir. 2002) (concluding that specialty license 
plates constitute private speech). 
 88. See Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 795 (4th Cir. 
2004) (“In the license plate forum, South Carolina has authorized the expression 
of only one position of the debate, thereby promoting the expression of one 
viewpoint (pro-life) while preventing the expression of the other viewpoint (pro-
choice).”). 
 89. Id. at 795; see also Sons of Confederate Veterans, 288 F.3d at 618 (“The 
rationale behind the government’s authority to draw otherwise impermissible 
viewpoint distinctions in the government speech context is the accountability 
inherent in the political process.”). 
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government was the literal speaker and, therefore, could not hold 
the government accountable through the electoral process.90 
Thus, South Carolina’s approving a “Choose Life” plate amounted 
to viewpoint discrimination under the First Amendment.91 
In Arizona Life Coalition, Inc. v. Stanton,92 the Ninth Circuit 
applied the Fourth Circuit’s SCV four-factor test and reached the 
same result as the SCV court—that the specialty plate was 
private speech.93 The specialty plate program in Stanton differed 
significantly from the programs in SCV and Rose. Whereas 
Virginia and South Carolina had to pass legislation authorizing 
each specialty plate, nonprofit organizations seeking an Arizona 
specialty plate could submit an application directly to the Arizona 
Department of Transportation (Arizona DOT).94 Once the Arizona 
DOT certified that the organization was a nonprofit, it submitted 
the plate request to the Arizona License Plate Commission.95 
Pursuant to statute, the Commission was required to issue the 
specialty plate if the organization served the community, 
contributed to the welfare of others, and was not offensive or 
discriminatory in its purpose or name.96 Under this 
                                                                                                     
 90. See Rose, 361 F.3d at 794–95 (arguing that the state’s advocacy of the 
pro-life viewpoint is veiled because people do not identify the state as the 
speaker in the specialty license plate context). 
 91. Id. at 799 (“In sum, South Carolina has engaged in viewpoint 
discrimination by allowing only the Choose Life plate, and it has insulated itself 
from electoral accountability by disguising its own pro-life advocacy. This is 
prohibited by the First Amendment.”); see also id. at 800 (Luttig, J., concurring) 
(“[W]here the private speech component is substantial and the government 
speech component less than compelling, viewpoint discrimination by the state is 
prohibited.”). 
 92. 515 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 93. Id. at 960 (“Messages conveyed through special organization plates—
although possessing some characteristics of government speech—represent 
primarily private speech.”). 
 94. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-2404 (2011) (outlining the procedures by 
which special organizations may obtain specialty license plates). 
 95. See id. § 28-2404(A) (stating that if the department “determines the 
organization meets the [statutory] requirements of an organization . . . , the 
department shall submit the request for a special organization plate to the 
license plate commission”); Stanton, 515 F.3d at 961 (discussing the Arizona 
specialty license plate program). 
 96. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-2404(B) (2011). Pursuant to statute, the 
organization also could not “promote a specific religion, faith or antireligious 
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administrative procedure, neither the legislature nor the 
executive had the authority to approve (or to deny) the 
organization’s plate or to control the plate’s design or content: 
“[T]he statutory requirements address who may speak, not what 
they may say.”97 
The Arizona Life Coalition, a nonprofit, applied for a “Choose 
Life” plate.98 Despite meeting Arizona’s statutory requirements, 
the Commission denied its application, and the Arizona Life 
Coalition sued on First Amendment grounds.99 The plaintiffs 
argued that the Ninth Circuit should apply Johanns, a 2005 
compelled subsidy case that involved government speech, when 
deciding whether specialty plates were government speech.100 The 
Ninth Circuit declined the invitation and instead distinguished 
Johanns, arguing that Johanns did not apply because Arizona 
Life Coalition’s claims implicated neither compelled speech nor 
compelled subsidies.101 According to the court, the operative First 
Amendment question was whether Arizona Life Coalition was 
“‘being denied the opportunity to speak on the same terms as 
other private citizens within a government sponsored forum,’” not 
whether third parties were being forced to contribute money to 
the government to sponsor the speech of others.102  
Moreover, even though Johanns involved a compelled 
subsidy, the court viewed Johanns as consistent with the Fourth 
Circuit’s four-factor test.103 Because the Commission had only “de 
minimis editorial control over the plate design and color,” there 
was no basis for “finding that the messages conveyed by the 
                                                                                                     
belief.” Id. 
 97. Stanton, 515 F.3d at 966. 
 98. Id. at 961. 
 99. Id. at 962. 
 100. See id. at 964 (addressing the issue of whether Johanns applied to the 
case at hand). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. (quoting ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 386 (6th Cir. 
2006) (Martin, J., dissenting)). 
 103. See id. at 965 (“We therefore adopt the Fourth Circuit’s four-factor 
test—supported by the Supreme Court’s decision in Johanns—to determine 
whether messages conveyed through Arizona’s special organization plate 
program constitute[d] government or private speech.”). 
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organization constitute government speech.”104 Under Arizona’s 
administrative procedure for specialty plates, the Arizona Life 
Coalition controlled the message on the plate, not the state, and 
individual vehicle owners chose to carry their favored message.105 
As a result, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the specialty plates 
were private speech and that the Commission engaged in 
viewpoint-based discrimination in denying the Arizona Life 
Coalition’s specialty plate application.106 The Arizona program 
did not prohibit abortion-related speech and was open to all 
organizations that met the statutory requirements.107 Because 
Arizona Life Coalition met those requirements, the court 
remanded the case with instructions to require the Commission 
to issue the “Choose Life” plate.108 
2. The Seventh and Eighth Circuits’ Literal Speaker Test: 
Specialty Plates as Private Speech 
In 2008, the Seventh Circuit weighed in on the First 
Amendment status of specialty license plates.109 Under Illinois 
law, specialty plates required legislative approval.110 Choose Life 
of Illinois, Inc. pursued legislation that would authorize a 
                                                                                                     
 104. Id. at 966. The Ninth Circuit also analogized specialty plates to vanity 
license plates, which, subject to some general rules precluding offensive and 
sexual references, or both, enable vehicle owners to select a specific combination 
of letters and numbers on a state issued license plate (for example, CRZN, 
4HIM, T TIME, and L8 AGN). See id. at 967. The fact that “most courts that 
have addressed vanity plates have concluded the messages are private speech” 
reinforced its conclusion that specialty plates also are private speech. Id. at 967; 
see also Perry v. McDonald, 280 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding no First 
Amendment right to use a vanity plate bearing the letters “SHTHPNS”); Lewis 
v. McDonald, 253 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 2001) (addressing whether a state 
could deny a request for a vanity plate reading “ARYAN-1”). 
 105. See Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 967 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(“[I]ndividual members who choose to purchase the [‘Choose Life’] plate 
voluntarily choose to disperse that message.”). 
 106. Id. at 973. 
 107. Id. at 971. 
 108. Id. at 973. 
 109. Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 867 (7th Cir. 2008).  
 110. See 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-600(a) (2012) (“The Secretary of State shall 
issue only special plates that have been authorized by the General Assembly.”). 
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“Choose Life” plate, collecting more than 25,000 signatures from 
prospective purchasers.111 Despite the broad support for such a 
plate, the Illinois legislature did not approve the plate.112 Choose 
Life Illinois then brought an action alleging that the state had 
violated the group’s free speech rights by denying it access to the 
state-created specialty plate forum.113 The district court agreed 
with Choose Life Illinois, finding that the state had engaged in 
viewpoint discrimination.114 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed. Although the court 
found the reasoning of the Fourth and Ninth Circuits persuasive, 
it determined that the four-factor test “can be distilled (and 
simplified) by focusing on the following inquiry: Under all the 
circumstances, would a reasonable person consider the speaker to 
be the government or a private party.”115 Echoing the analysis in 
Rose and Stanton, the court concluded that specialty plates were 
private speech,116 because (i) reasonable observers are apt to 
associate a specialty plate with the sponsoring organization and 
the vehicle owner rather than the state, (ii) the government’s 
purpose is to raise money through the specialty plate program 
and not to express its own message, and (iii) the state and the 
sponsoring groups share editorial control regarding the plate’s 
                                                                                                     
 111. White, 547 F.3d at 857. 
 112. See id. at 855 (“Despite the strong showing of support, the proposal for 
a ‘Choose Life’ license plate died in subcommittee.”). 
 113. Id. 
 114. See id. at 857 (“[T]he [district] court concluded that the Illinois 
specialty-plate program established a forum for private speech and that the 
exclusion of the ‘Choose Life’ message from this forum was viewpoint 
discrimination and could not withstand strict scrutiny.”).  
 115. Id. at 863. In Summum, Justice Souter advocated for the same test: 
“[T]he best approach that occurs to me is to ask whether a reasonable and fully 
informed observer would understand the expression to be government speech, as 
distinct from private speech the government chooses to oblige.” Pleasant Grove 
City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460. 487 (2009) (Souter, J., concurring). As discussed 
below, Justice Souter’s concurrence reprises the test that the majority rejected 
in Johanns, and no other Justice joined his concurrence in Summum. See infra 
notes 186–87. 
 116. See Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 863 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(“[The court] arrive[s] at the same conclusion as in . . . Rose, and Stanton: 
Messages on specialty license plates cannot be characterized as the 
government’s speech.”). 
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message and design.117 Consistent with Stanton, the court also 
held that Johanns did not convert the private speech into 
government speech because specialty plates did not implicate 
compelled speech or a compelled subsidy.118 
Choose Life Illinois, Inc. v. White119 makes the First 
Amendment analysis of specialty plates even more complicated 
because the Seventh Circuit departed from Stanton by holding 
that Illinois’s denial of the “Choose Life” plate did not constitute 
viewpoint discrimination.120 Although the distinction between 
content and viewpoint discrimination “is not a precise one,”121 the 
Seventh Circuit surmised that the State of Illinois had excluded 
the entire subject of abortion, not simply a particular viewpoint 
on that subject.122 Under the Supreme Court’s forum doctrine, 
such content-based exclusion is permissible in a limited 
designated forum provided that it is reasonable.123 The court 
concluded that Illinois’s exclusion of the topic of abortion was 
                                                                                                     
 117. See id. at 863–64 (describing the factors that weigh in favor of finding 
elements of private speech that rule out the government-speech doctrine).  
 118. See id. at 863 (“Like many states, Illinois invites private civic and 
charitable organizations to place their messages on specialty license plates.”). 
 119. 547 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 120. See id. at 865 (“[The restriction of abortion-related specialty-plates] is a 
permissible content-based restriction on access to the specialty-plate forum, not 
an impermissible act of discrimination based on viewpoint.”). 
 121. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831 
(1995).  
 122. See White, 547 F.3d at 865 (determining that Illinois had excluded the 
entire subject of abortion from specialty plates, resulting in a permissible 
content-based restriction). As the concurrence notes, the only evidence that 
Illinois decided to exclude the subject of abortion “is nothing more than the 
Illinois legislature rejecting efforts to approve a single specialty license plate, 
‘Choose Life.’ . . . by rejecting a ‘Choose Life’ plate, it is not clear to me that the 
legislature decided to exclude ‘the entire subject of abortion.’” Id. at 867 (Manion, 
J., concurring). 
 123. See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829–30 (“[W]e have observed a 
distinction between, on the one hand, content discrimination, which may be 
permissible if it preserves the purposes of that limited forum, and, on the other 
hand, viewpoint discrimination, which is presumed impermissible when directed 
against speech otherwise within the forum’s limitations.”); Ariz. Life Coal. v. 
Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 969 (9th Cir. 2008) (“A limited public forum exists when 
the government intentionally opens a nonpublic forum to expressive activity by 
a certain class of speakers to address a particular class of topics.” (citing 
Cogswell v. City of Seattle, 347 F.3d 809, 814 (9th Cir. 2003))). 
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reasonable because “messages on specialty license plates give the 
appearance of having the government’s endorsement, and Illinois 
does not wish to be perceived as endorsing any position on the 
subject of abortion.”124 Thus, the Illinois legislature’s denying the 
“Choose Life” plate did not violate the free speech rights of 
Choose Life of Illinois because those rights were not implicated by 
Illinois’s specialty license plate forum. 
In Roach v. Stouffer,125 the Eighth Circuit also was called on 
to resolve whether a “Choose Life” specialty plate was 
government speech or private speech.126 Under Missouri’s 
specialty plate program, there were two ways to get specialty 
plates approved: (i) legislative enactment and (ii) department of 
revenue (DOR) approval.127 Choose Life of Missouri submitted an 
application to the DOR for a “Choose Life” plate and met the 
                                                                                                     
 124. White, 547 F.3d at 855. There is a palpable tension in the Seventh 
Circuit’s analysis. The court concludes that specialty plates are private speech 
because their “messages are most closely associated with drivers and the 
sponsoring organizations, and the driver is the ultimate communicator of the 
message.” Id. at 864. If true, then it is not clear why the government reasonably 
can believe that third parties will view the state as endorsing a message about 
abortion. Id. at 855. After all, under the Seventh Circuit’s simplified version of 
the SCV test, a reasonable observer considers the speaker to be the driver, not 
the government. Id. at 864. That is the main reason why specialty plates are 
private speech. Hence, the Seventh Circuit’s attempt to distinguish Stanton is 
unavailing. 
 125. 560 F.3d 860 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 126. Id. at 863.  
 127. See id. at 862 (noting that Missouri provides two methods to create 
specialty license plates); MO. REV. STAT. § 301.3150 (2012) (describing the 
process for department of revenue approval). The Eighth Circuit considers only 
the administrative process and does not have occasion to analyze whether the 
legislative process, pursuant to which the legislature passes a statute creating a 
specialty plate, might make the government responsible for the content of the 
specialty plate. See Roach, 560 F.3d at 869–70 (analyzing the amount of 
discretion allowed in the administrative process for the approval of specialty 
plates). This latter question is important given that (a) the legislative process 
accounted for roughly seventy of Missouri’s specialty plates and (b) the Missouri 
legislature has passed legislation creating a variety of specialty license plates 
(for example, “We Shall Not Forget,” “God Bless America,” “Conservation,” and 
“Be an Organ Donor”) that are not (at least on their face) readily identifiable 
with a sponsoring organization and that may express a policy that the state of 
Missouri seeks to promote and encourage. Id. at 862; see also MO. REV. STAT. 
§§ 301.3032–.3148 (noting various specialty license plates approved by the 
Missouri legislature).  
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statutory requirements under Missouri law.128 Under the DOR 
process, though, a joint committee on transportation reviewed 
each application and voted to approve or deny the specialty plate 
request.129 If the joint committee “receives a signed petition from 
five house members or two senators that they are opposed to the 
approval of the proposed license plate,” then the committee must 
reject the application.130 Because two senators objected to the 
“Choose Life” plate, the committee denied Choose Life of 
Missouri’s application.131 In response, the organization sued, 
arguing that the denial of its application violated the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments.132 The district court ruled that the 
specialty plates were private speech and that Missouri’s DOR 
process lacked adequate guidelines to prevent viewpoint 
discrimination.133 
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit identified the same threshold 
question as the other circuits: “whether the messages contained 
on specialty plates communicate government or private 
speech.”134 After reviewing the case law from other circuits, the 
court adopted White’s simplified version of the SCV test—the 
literal speaker test: “Our analysis boils down to one key question: 
whether, under all the circumstances, a reasonable and fully 
informed observer would consider the speaker to be the 
government or a private party.”135 Following SCV, Stanton, and 
White, the Eighth Circuit concluded that specialty plates are 
private speech under this test: “[W]e now join the Fourth, 
Seventh and Ninth Circuits in concluding that a reasonable and 
                                                                                                     
 128. Roach, 560 F.3d at 863.  
 129. See id. at 862 (“The department of revenue shall submit for approval all 
applications for the development of specialty plates to the joint committee on 
transportation oversight during a regular session of the general assembly for 
approval.” (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 301.3150 (2012))). 
 130. Id. (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 21.795(6) (2005) (amended 2009)). 
 131. Id. at 863. 
 132. See id. (claiming violation of “rights to free speech, due process and 
equal protection under the United States Constitution”). 
 133. See id. (“The district court held that the specialty plates constituted 
private speech and that the statutory scheme lacked adequate guidelines to 
prevent viewpoint discrimination by the state . . . .”). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 867. 
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fully informed observer would consider the speaker to be the 
organization that sponsors and the vehicle owner who displays 
the specialty license plate.”136 
Although the SCV test included four factors, Roach 
reasonably included the Fourth Circuit in the list of courts 
applying the literal speaker test. Under Judge Michael’s analysis 
in Rose, “no one who sees a specialty license plate imprinted with 
the phrase ‘Choose Life’ would doubt that the owner of that 
vehicle holds a pro-life viewpoint.”137 From this, he concluded that 
the literal speaker “appears to be the vehicle owner, not the 
State, just as the literal speaker of a bumper sticker message is 
the vehicle owner, not the producer of the bumper sticker.”138 
Judge Michael also acknowledged that the “same reasoning” 
applies to the “ultimate responsibility” prong of the SCV-Rose 
test.139 Given that the reasoning is the same for the literal 
speaker and ultimate responsibility prongs, Roach reasonably 
views these factors as being effectively the same.140 Moreover, 
although the first two SCV factors suggested government speech 
and the second two factors indicated private speech, the Fourth 
Circuit ultimately treated the South Carolina “Choose Life” plate 
as private speech in a designated limited forum based in large 
part on the identity of the speaker as determined by a reasonable 
                                                                                                     
 136. Id. 
 137. Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 794 (4th Cir. 
2004). 
 138. Id. at 794. As discussed more fully below, the bumper sticker analogy, 
while having superficial appeal, misrepresents two important aspects of the 
specialty plate context. First, unlike with bumper stickers, the state owns the 
license plates. They are government property and bear the name of the issuing 
state. Second, in states like Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and 
Tennessee, each specialty plate must be authorized by legislative act. The 
legislative and executive branches have exclusive authority to decide on the 
language and symbols included on the plate. The government lacks such control 
over the content of bumper stickers. 
 139. Id. 
 140. See Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 867 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Our analysis 
boils down to one key question: whether, under all the circumstances, a 
reasonable and fully informed observer would consider the speaker to be the 
government or a private party.”). 
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observer.141 Thus, even in the Fourth Circuit, the literal speaker 
prong appears to be determinative in the specialty plate context. 
Applying the literal speaker test, the Eighth Circuit, 
following Rose and White, relied heavily on its assessment of the 
purpose of the specialty plate program—to raise money and to 
allow private groups to promote their organizations and 
messages—and how a reasonable person would interpret the 
specialty plates—as conveying a message on behalf of the 
sponsoring organization and the vehicle owner.142 Given that 
Missouri offers more than 200 specialty plates, “a reasonable 
observer could not think that the State of Missouri communicates 
all of those messages.”143 In addition, the reasonable observer 
would know that the owner made the effort to purchase the 
specialty plate to convey her own message and not a message 
forced on the owner by the state.144 Thus, specialty plates 
promoted private speech in a state-created forum, and Missouri 
could not discriminate against particular viewpoints in that 
forum.145 Because Missouri’s specialty plate scheme provided “no 
standards or guidelines whatsoever,”146 the joint committee had 
“unbridled discretion” to deny Choose Life of Missouri’s 
application based on the organization’s viewpoint.147 This 
unfettered discretion rendered the DOR process 
unconstitutional.148 
                                                                                                     
 141. See Rose, 361 F.3d at 798 (“The medium here—the specialty license 
plate scheme—is more like a limited forum for expression than it is like a 
school, museum, or clinic.”). 
 142. See, e.g., Roach, 560 F.3d at 867–68 (“[T]he organizations that sponsor 
the specialty plates and the vehicle owners who choose to purchase and display 
them are the literal speakers who bear the ultimate responsibility for the 
message.”). 
 143. Id. at 868. 
 144. See id. (“[A] reasonable observer would understand that the vehicle 
owner took the initiative to purchase the specialty plate and is voluntarily 
communicating his or her own message, not the message of the state.”). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 869. 
 147. See id. at 869–70 (reviewing the statute and noting that no standard for 
review for specialty plates is given).  
 148. Id. at 870.  
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In reaching this conclusion, the Eighth Circuit rejected the 
claim that specialty plates were government speech under the 
Court’s 2009 Summum decision.149 In a footnote, the Eighth 
Circuit attempted to distinguish Summum.150 Whereas Summum 
dealt with “privately-donated monuments in a city park,” 
specialty plates implicated “a much different issue: whether 
specialty license plates on privately-owned vehicles communicate 
government speech.”151 According to the Eighth Circuit, specialty 
plates, unlike monuments in public parks, permit expressive 
conduct on the part of organizations and their supporters, not the 
government.152  
The Eighth Circuit’s discussion of Summum ignores an 
important feature of the Court’s reasoning—that donors may 
send a message through a monument even though the 
government accepts the monument for its own, and possibly 
different, reasons: “[I]t frequently is not possible to identify a 
single ‘message’ that is conveyed by an object or structure, and 
consequently, the thoughts or sentiments expressed by a 
government entity that accepts and displays such an object may 
be quite different from those of either its creator or its donor.”153 
The Fraternal Order of Eagles certainly received a benefit from 
having its name, symbols, and message inscribed on a monument 
in a city park even though, as the Court confirmed in Summum, 
Pleasant Grove City adopted that monument to send its own 
message.154 Thus, contrary to the Eighth Circuit’s cursory 
                                                                                                     
 149. See id. at 868 (“[W]e conclude that the messages communicated on 
specialty plates are private speech, not government speech.”). 
 150. Id. at 868 n.3.  
 151. Id.  
 152. Id. 
 153. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 476 (2009). 
 154. The Ten Commandments monument in Summum is “virtually 
identical” to the monument displayed on the Texas Capitol grounds that was at 
issue in Van Orden. Summum, 555 U.S. at 483 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also 
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681–82 (2005) (describing the monument of 
the Ten Commandments). Both monuments were “donated by the Eagles ‘as 
part of that organization’s efforts to combat juvenile delinquency.’” Summum, 
555 U.S. at 483 (quoting Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 701). As the Court noted in Van 
Orden, the State of Texas “had a valid secular purpose in recognizing and 
commending the Eagles for their efforts to reduce juvenile delinquency” even 
though the monument included “the text of the Ten Commandments[, a]n eagle 
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attempt to distinguish Summum, Summum and Johanns have 
much more to say about the government speech–private speech 
distinction. In fact, as I argue below, these cases articulate a new 
test for government speech, a test that is inconsistent with the 
literal speaker test adopted by the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and 
Ninth Circuits.  
3. The Sixth Circuit’s Johanns Test: Specialty Plates as 
Government Speech 
In 2006, the Sixth Circuit was asked to consider the 
constitutionality of Tennessee’s specialty plate program.155 The 
Tennessee legislature had passed a statute authorizing a “Choose 
Life” plate.156 Pursuant to that statute, half of the proceeds from 
the sale of the plate went to New Life Resources, Inc., which had 
to use the funds “exclusively for counseling and financial 
assistance, including food, clothing, and medical assistance for 
pregnant women in Tennessee.”157 While the bill was being 
considered, certain pro-choice groups sought to amend the statute 
to allow a “Pro-Choice” specialty plate, but the legislature 
rebuffed their requests.158 After the “Choose Life” plate was 
approved, the American Civil Liberties Union and others 
challenged Tennessee’s “Choose Life” plate, arguing that the 
statute violated the speech rights of groups advocating 
alternative viewpoints on the abortion issue.159 The district court, 
applying the Fourth Circuit’s four-factor test, agreed and 
enjoined enforcement of the statute.160 
                                                                                                     
grasping the American flag, an eye inside of a pyramid, . . . two small tablets 
with what appears to be an ancient script . . . [,] two Stars of David and the 
superimposed Greek letters Chi and Rho, which represent Christ.” Van Orden, 
545 U.S. at 681–82. 
 155. ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 380 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 156. Id. at 372. 
 157. Id. (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-4-306(c) (2013)).  
 158. Id. 
 159. See id. (claiming the act is facially unconstitutional). 
 160. Id. 
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On appeal, a split panel of the Sixth Circuit reversed. The 
majority relied on the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Johanns, 
contending that Johanns established a new test for government 
speech: “Johanns stands for the proposition that when the 
government determines an overarching message and retains 
power to approve every word disseminated at its behest, the 
message must be attributed to the government for First 
Amendment purposes.”161 In Johanns, the Court emphasized the 
government’s complete control—“from beginning to end”—over 
the “Beef. It’s What’s for Dinner” message.162 As a result, instead 
of analyzing the four factors set out in SCV and Rose, the Sixth 
Circuit focused on the level of control the Tennessee legislature 
had over the “Choose Life” plate.163 The majority determined that 
Tennessee had the same type of control over the “Choose Life” 
license plate as the government had over the beef advertising 
campaign in Johanns.164 Under Tennessee’s statutory scheme, 
the legislature established “the overall message to be 
communicated,” “wield[ed] ‘final approval authority over every 
word used,’” and “retain[ed] a veto over its design.”165 Thus, the 
“Choose Life” plate was government speech, promulgating 
“Tennessee’s own message.”166 
That the “Choose Life” plate was government speech meant 
that Tennessee’s specialty plate program did not create a forum 
for private speech and, consequently, that Tennessee could 
promote a “Choose Life” message on its specialty plates without 
offering plates expressing other views on abortion. Given that 
“[g]overnment in this age is large and involved in practically 
every aspect of life,” the majority found it reasonable that 
“Tennessee would use its license plate program to convey 
messages regarding over one hundred groups, ideologies, 
                                                                                                     
 161. Id. at 375. 
 162. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 560–61 (2005) 
(noting that Congress and the Secretary of Agriculture set the overarching 
message and a committee, answerable to the Secretary, developed the 
remaining details).  
 163. ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 376 (6th Cir. 2006).  
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. (citations omitted). 
 166. Id. (quoting Johanns, 544 U.S. at 562). 
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activities, and colleges.”167 If specialty plates were private speech, 
the state would lose its ability to convey its preferred messages in 
other contexts as well, such as “Register to Vote” pins, “Win the 
War” stamps, and “Spay or Neuter your Pets” license plates.168 
Moreover, Tennessee might be required to approve plates for the 
KKK and the American Nazi Party.169 According to the court, 
“[s]uch an argument falls of its own weight” and eviscerates the 
government’s right to speak for itself.170  
In dissent, Judge Martin sought to distinguish and limit 
Johanns to the compelled subsidy context. According to Judge 
Martin, Johanns dealt with a compelled subsidy “where who is 
speaking is determinative, and if it is the government, consistent 
with its broad taxing authority, that speech is immune from First 
Amendment challenge.”171 Tennessee’s specialty plate program 
was meant to foster private speech,172 so Johanns simply did not 
apply in the speech forum context:  
Thus, the government speech doctrine, a la Johanns, is not the 
determinative question in this case. The specialty license plate 
issue at hand does not involve compelled speech. It does not 
involve a compelled subsidy for a private entity. And, it does 
not involve a compelled subsidy to support a government 
message.173  
On this view, Johanns is not “a watershed First Amendment 
case” and “does not transform all First Amendment doctrine.”174 
Instead, Johanns is concerned only with the compelled subsidy of 
speech, which Judge Martin believes is far removed from 
Tennessee’s specialty license plate program.175 For Judge Martin, 
Tennessee’s program, like the programs in Rose, Stanton, and 
                                                                                                     
 167. Id.  
 168. Id. at 378–79.  
 169. Id. at 376–79. 
 170. Id. at 377. 
 171. Id. at 387 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
 172. Id. at 381. 
 173. Id. at 386. 
 174. Id. at 387 n.12. 
 175. See id. at 387 (noting that the harm “is being denied the opportunity to 
speak on the same terms as other private citizens within a government 
sponsored program”). 
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Roach, impermissibly discriminates based on viewpoint by 
allowing a “Choose Life” plate while prohibiting alternative views 
on abortion.176 
B. Summum and the Government Speech Doctrine: Johanns 
Applies Broadly to All Speech over Which the Government Has 
Effective Control 
In the wake of Bredesen, SCV, Rose, Stanton, White, and 
Roach, the threshold question in specialty license plate cases is 
not simply whether specialty plates are government or private 
speech,177 but whether Johanns’s control test or the literal 
speaker test governs that determination. The answer to that 
question, in turn, depends on the scope of the government speech 
doctrine post-Summum. If the government speech doctrine 
applies broadly to government expression over which the state 
has effective control, then much of Judge Martin’s criticism of the 
majority opinion in Bredesen—as well as the arguments made by 
the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits—falls away. If 
not, then the majority position properly cabined Johanns to the 
compelled subsidy context, and the literal speaker test endures. 
Thus, any analysis of specialty license plates now requires a 
careful review of Summum. 
In Summum, the Court considered whether Pleasant Grove 
City could refuse to display in a park a monument containing the 
Seven Aphorisms of the Summum religion when the City already 
                                                                                                     
 176. See id. at 390 (“I would hold that Tennessee created a forum to 
encourage a diversity of viewpoints from private speakers and therefore the 
Constitution requires viewpoint neutrality.”). 
 177. Government speech has received considerable attention over the last 
few years. Given that many circuits have employed some variation of the literal 
speaker test, it is not surprising that much of this literature has focused on the 
literal speaker test or SCV’s mixed speech analysis. See, e.g., Corbin, supra note 
25; Claudia E. Haupt, Mixed Public-Private Speech and the Establishment 
Clause, 85 TUL. L. REV. 571 (2011); Amy R. Lucas, Comment, Specialty License 
Plates: The First Amendment and the Intersection of Government Speech and 
Public Forum Doctrines, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1971 (2008); Norton, supra note 25; 
Andy G. Olree, Identifying Government Speech, 42 CONN. L. REV. 365 (2009); 
Mark Strasser, Ignore the Man Behind the Curtain: On the Government Speech 
Doctrine and What It Licenses, 21 B.U. PUB. INTEREST L.J. 85 (2011). 
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displayed a monument inscribed with the Ten Commandments.178 
Although directly involving religious expression in the public 
sphere, the Court decided the case on First Amendment speech, 
not Establishment Clause, grounds. In particular, the Court 
unanimously adopted the government speech doctrine, holding 
that the City could accept some facially religious monuments 
while rejecting others.179 The Court confirmed what it previously 
had suggested in Southworth, Rust, and Johanns—that the 
government “has the right ‘to speak for itself’”180 and that when 
speaking the government “‘is entitled to say what it wishes’”181 
and “to select the views that it wants to express.”182 Because the 
government is not regulating a forum when speaking but is 
giving expression to its own views, “the government’s own 
speech . . . is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny.”183 As a 
speaker, the government can discriminate based on content and 
viewpoint.184 To hold otherwise would be to undermine the 
government’s ability to function:  
If every citizen were to have a right to insist that no one paid 
by public funds express a view with which he disagreed, 
debate over issues of great concern to the public would be 
limited to those in the private sector, and the process of 
government as we know it radically transformed.185 
But under Summum, what does the government have to do 
to qualify for the protection of the government speech doctrine? 
                                                                                                     
 178. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 464–65 (2009).  
 179. Id. at 481. 
 180. Id. at 467 (quoting Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. 
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000)). 
 181. Id. at 467–68 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of 
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)). 
 182. Id. at 468. 
 183. Id. at 467 (quoting Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 
(2005)).  
 184. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 
833 (1995) (stating that, if the government is speaking, “it may make content-
based choices”); Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 792 (4th 
Cir. 2004) (“[W]hen the government speaks for itself and is not regulating the 
speech of others, it may discriminate based on viewpoint . . . .”). 
 185. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 468 (2009) (quoting 
Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1990)).  
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According to the majority of circuit courts that have reached the 
issue, the government is speaking for government speech doctrine 
purposes only if a reasonable person would attribute the 
expressive activity to the government.186 Justice Souter advocated 
for this test in his concurrence in Summum and his dissent in 
Johanns: “[T]he best approach that occurs to me is to ask 
whether a reasonable and fully informed observer would 
understand the expression to be government speech.”187 The 
problem is that a majority of the Court has never adopted Justice 
Souter’s proposed test. Instead, Summum focused on the level of 
governmental control over the message conveyed: “In this case, it 
is clear that the monuments in Pleasant Grove’s Pioneer Park 
represent government speech . . . because the City has ‘effectively 
controlled’ the messages sent by the monuments in the Park by 
exercising ‘final approval authority’ over their selection.”188 Under 
Summum, if the government exercises effective control over the 
message, it becomes the speaker and may claim the fundamental 
right protected by the Speech Clause—the right to choose its own 
message: “[T]he fundamental rule of protection under the First 
Amendment [is] that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the 
content of his own message.”189 
For specialty license plates to fall within the government 
speech doctrine, a state must have sufficient control over the 
selection and approval process to ensure that the government is 
                                                                                                     
 186. See, e.g., Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 867 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Our 
analysis boils down to one key question: whether, under all the circumstances, a 
reasonable and fully informed observer would consider the speaker to be the 
government or a private party.”); Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 
863 (7th Cir. 2008) (listing the relevant factors in making this determination as: 
“the degree to which the message originates with the government, the degree to 
which the government exercises editorial control over the message, and whether 
the government or a private party communicates the message”). 
 187. Summum, 555 U.S. at 487 (Souter, J., concurring); see also Johanns v. 
Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 578 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“It 
means nothing that Government officials control the message if that fact is 
never required to be made apparent to those who get the message, let alone if it 
is affirmatively concealed from them.”). 
 188. Summum, 555 U.S. at 473 (majority opinion) (quoting Johanns, 544 
U.S. at 560–61 (majority opinion)). 
 189. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 
U.S. 557, 573 (1995). 
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sending its own message as opposed to simply facilitating the 
speech of private parties. As Bredesen, on the one hand, and SCV, 
Rose, Stanton, White, and Roach¸ on the other, demonstrate, the 
control test and the literal speaker test give different—and 
inconsistent—results in the specialty plate context.190 Thus, 
whether an organization can force the government to issue a “Kill 
the Sea Turtles” plate depends on whether Summum’s control 
test supplants the literal speaker test espoused by Justice Souter 
and several circuit courts. 
III. Specialty License Plates are Government Speech if the State 
Effectively Controls the Message Conveyed by Its Specialty Plates 
and Has Final Approval Authority over Their Selection 
The government speech–private speech distinction is critical 
in the specialty plate context because how the speech is classified 
is dispositive of the First Amendment challenge. If specialty 
plates are government speech, then the First Amendment does 
not apply: “The Free Speech Clause restricts government 
regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government 
speech.”191 A state may speak through its specialty plates and 
even engage in viewpoint discrimination by offering a plate 
promoting one message (“Save the Sea Turtles” or “Choose Life”) 
while precluding different messages on the same topic (“Kill the 
Sea Turtles” or “Respect Choice”). If specialty plates are private 
speech, the First Amendment applies fully, and any restriction on 
specialty plates must be, at a minimum, reasonable and viewpoint 
neutral. 
As the Supreme Court acknowledges in Summum, “[t]here 
may be situations in which it is difficult to tell whether a 
government entity is speaking on its own behalf or is providing a 
forum for private speech.”192 The split between and among the 
circuits bears this out. Summum, though, provides a new 
standard that is inconsistent with the subjective test that many 
                                                                                                     
 190. Supra Part II.A.  
 191. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009). 
 192. Id. at 470. 
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of the circuit courts have used—the reasonable observer’s 
perception of whom is speaking.193 Thus, in the wake of 
Summum, the analysis of specialty plates by the Fourth, 
Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits is wrong. 
Specifically, the majority’s literal speaker test is inconsistent 
with the government speech doctrine set forth in Johanns and 
Summum for at least two reasons. First, unlike the four-factor 
test developed in SCV, Summum and Johanns focus on the level 
of control the government exercises over the speech, not on whom 
a reasonable observer views as the literal speaker.194 As a 
result, the nature of the specialty plate program is important.195 
If states, such as Arizona and Missouri, create an administrative 
procedure that authorizes all specialty plates that organizations 
meeting some minimal statutorily defined criteria propose, then 
the plates may be private speech. Rather than retain control over 
the messages, the government permits any group meeting the 
specified criteria to express its views on the subjects permitted in 
that forum. If, however, states must pass legislation to authorize 
a specialty plate, then the government retains greater control 
over the content and approval process for each plate. Under 
Summum, this difference in control makes a constitutional 
difference. When a state “has ‘effectively controlled’ the messages 
                                                                                                     
 193. Justice Souter advocates for the literal speaker test, in part, to provide 
consistency between the Establishment Clause and Free Speech Clause 
analyses: “This reasonable observer test for governmental character is of a piece 
with the one for spotting forbidden governmental endorsement of religion in the 
Establishment Clause cases.” Summum, 555 U.S. at 487 (Souter, J., 
concurring). The criticisms of the endorsement test apply with equal force to the 
literal speaker test. See, e.g., Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh 
Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 669 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting) (“For 
the reasons expressed below, I submit that the endorsement test is flawed in its 
fundamentals and unworkable in practice.”).  
 194. See Summum, 555 U.S. at 473 (“[T]he City has ‘effectively controlled’ 
the messages sent by the monuments in the Park by exercising ‘final approval 
authority’ over their selection.”); Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 
550, 560 (2005) (“The message of the promotional campaigns is effectively 
controlled by the Federal Government itself.”). 
 195. The literal speaker test does not distinguish between a specialty plate 
program that requires legislative enactment and one that establishes an 
administrative procedure. The literal speaker associates specialty plates with 
the driver under both programs even though the government exercises 
substantially different levels of control over the speech in each program. 
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sent by [specialty license plates] by exercising ‘final approval 
authority’ over their selection,” the plates are government 
speech.196  
Second, several of the circuit courts improperly attempt to 
limit the government speech doctrine to cases like Rust and 
Johanns where the government sponsors a specific “program” or 
the speech is “‘part of a larger governmental scheme to encourage 
some private activity, like beef consumption.’”197 Neither 
Summum nor Johanns imposes such a “program” or “scheme” 
limitation on the government speech doctrine. In fact, Summum 
is inconsistent with any such requirement. The monuments in 
Summum were government speech even though there was no 
narrowly defined message or program at issue. As the Court 
explained, the park included fifteen permanent displays, at least 
eleven of which were donated by private groups or individuals, 
including “an historic granary, a wishing well, the City’s first fire 
station, a September 11 monument, and a Ten Commandments 
monument.”198 Such a collection of monuments does not 
constitute a government program like the family planning 
services in Rust v. Sullivan199 or the ad campaign in Johanns, yet 
the Court held that the monuments were government speech 
nonetheless.200 
                                                                                                     
 196. Summum, 555 U.S. at 473.  
 197. Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 964 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(quoting Andy G. Olree, Specialty License Plates: Look Who’s Talking in the 
Sixth Circuit, 68 ALA. LAW. 213, 214 (2007)); Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. 
Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 795 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he State has created a limited 
(license plate) forum for expression, not a government program such as one, for 
example, that would be carried out through a school, museum, or clinic.”).  
 198. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 465 (2008). 
 199. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991) (noting the absurd 
consequences of imposing viewpoint discrimination on government programs). 
 200. See Summum, 555 U.S. at 472 (“[I]t is clear that the monuments in 
Pleasant Grove’s Pioneer Park represent government speech.”). 
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A. Post-Summum, the Level of Government Control over the 
Content of the Message Determines Whether the Government is 
Speaking, Not the Identity of the “Literal Speaker” as Determined 
by a Reasonable Third Party Observer 
Although the SCV test purports to have four factors, the 
majority of circuit courts, following pre-Summum decisions from 
lower federal courts, takes the identity of the literal speaker as 
determined by a third party observer to be critical in the 
specialty plate context. As Judge Michael noted in Rose, “[N]o one 
who sees a specialty license plate imprinted with the phrase 
‘Choose Life’ would doubt that the owner of that vehicle holds a 
pro-life viewpoint. The literal speaker of the Choose Life message 
on the specialty plate therefore appears to be the vehicle 
owner, not the State.”201 Recognizing the central role the literal 
speaker prong plays in SCV and Rose, the Eighth Circuit 
concluded that the test “boils down to one key question: whether, 
under all the circumstances, a reasonable and fully informed 
observer would consider the speaker to be the government or a 
private party.”202 The Seventh Circuit reached the same result in 
White.203 
The problem is that the Supreme Court previously 
considered and rejected the “literal speaker” test. In a section of 
Johanns that the Seventh and Eighth Circuits did not discuss, 
the majority denied the respondents’ claim that 
“[c]ommunications cannot be ‘government speech,’ . . . if they 
are attributed to someone other than the government.”204 
Although many who viewed the “Beef. It’s What’s for Dinner” ads 
may not have known the government created the campaign, the 
Court held that the ads were still government speech: “[T]he 
                                                                                                     
 201. Rose, 361 F.3d at 794 (emphasis added). 
 202. Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 867 (8th Cir. 2009).  
 203. See Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 863 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(adopting the SCV factors but explaining that these factors “can be distilled 
(and simplified) by focusing on the following inquiry: Under all the 
circumstances, would a reasonable person consider the speaker to be the 
government or a private party”).  
 204. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 564–65 (2005) 
(“Since neither the Beef Act nor the Beef Order requires attribution, neither can 
be the cause of any possible First Amendment harm.”). 
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correct focus is not on whether the ads’ audience realizes the 
Government is speaking, but on the compelled assessment’s 
purported interference with respondents’ First Amendment 
rights.”205 The majority acknowledged that the identity of the 
speaker might be relevant to an as-applied compelled speech 
challenge, which would force respondents to show “that 
individual beef advertisements were attributed to [them].”206 
Because the beef producers were forced to subsidize the 
government’s speech, the attribution of that speech to a specific 
beef producer might support a compelled speech claim.207 In 
Johanns, though, there was no evidence of attribution to support 
an as-applied challenge, the only evidence in the record being one 
sentence that stated: “an employee of one of the respondent 
associations said he did not think the beef promotions would be 
attributed to his group.”208 Because the evidence did not show 
that there had been any attribution, there was no compelled 
speech and, consequently, no basis for an as-applied challenge.209 
Justice Souter advanced the same test for government 
speech in his Johanns dissent: “It means nothing that 
Government officials control the message if that fact is never 
required to be made apparent to those who get the message, let 
alone if it is affirmatively concealed from them.”210 In Summum, 
Justice Souter argued, consistent with his dissent in Johanns, 
that the identity requirement applied to all government speech, 
not just government speech in the compelled subsidy context of 
Johanns: “[T]he government should lose [the protection of the 
government speech doctrine] when the character of the speech is 
                                                                                                     
 205. Id. at 564 n.7. 
 206. Id. at 565 (emphasis added).  
 207. In his concurrence, Justice Thomas explained that, in his view, any 
unwanted association—regardless of the source of funding—would support a 
compelled speech claim: “The government may not, consistent with the First 
Amendment, associate individuals or organizations involuntarily with speech by 
attributing an unwanted message to them, whether or not those individuals 
fund the speech, and whether or not the message is under the government’s 
control.” Johanns, 544 U.S. at 568 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 208. Id. at 565–66 (majority opinion).  
 209. See id. (discussing the lack of basis for an as-applied challenge).  
 210. Id. at 578 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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at issue and its governmental nature has not been made clear.”211 
Because (i) the majority in Johanns expressly rejected the 
literal speaker test advanced by the respondents and Justice 
Souter212 and (ii) no other Justice joined Justice Souter’s 
Summum concurrence, Johanns precludes courts from limiting 
the government speech doctrine to situations in which a 
reasonable observer would know that the government is 
speaking.213 
Instead of considering who might appear to be speaking, the 
Johanns Court focused exclusively on the government’s control 
over the message when deciding whether the beef advertisements 
were government speech.214 Although a viewer reasonably might 
have thought the government was speaking, the advertisements 
in Johanns were government speech because the “message set 
out in the beef promotions is from beginning to end the message 
established by the Federal Government” and because the 
government “exercises final approval authority over every word 
used in every promotional campaign.”215 In his dissent, Justice 
Souter confirmed that the Johanns majority proffered a “control” 
test for government speech instead of considering whether a 
reasonable observer would identify the government as the 
speaker: “The Court takes the view that because Congress 
authorized this scheme and the Government controls (or at least 
has veto on) the content of the beef ads, the need for democratic 
accountability has been satisfied.”216 Justice Souter lamented 
that the majority applied the government speech doctrine even 
though the government’s control over the message was not 
“made apparent to those who get the message.”217 Thus, 
                                                                                                     
 211. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 485 (2009) (Souter, J., 
concurring). 
 212. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 564 n.7 (2005) 
(“But the correct focus is not on whether the ads’ audience realizes the 
Government is speaking . . . .”). 
 213. See id. (refusing to limit the government speech doctrine to situations 
where the third parties know that the government is speaking). 
 214. See id. at 560–62 (discussing the government’s complete control over 
the message).  
 215. Id. at 560–61 (emphasis added).  
 216. Id. at 578 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 217. Id. In the Rose opinion, Judge Michael anticipated Justice Souter’s 
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Justice Souter expressly acknowledged that the majority rejected 
his argument—that the government speech doctrine should 
apply only if a third party would understand the government to 
be the speaker—in favor of the “control” test that finds 
government speech where “Congress authorized this scheme and 
the Government controls (or at least has a veto on) the content 
of the beef ads.”218  
Moreover, any attempt to limit Johanns to the compelled 
subsidy context is unavailing in light of Summum.219 To 
determine whether the government is speaking, Summum 
followed Johanns and evaluated the level of control that the 
government exercised over the speech.220 In section IV of the 
opinion, the Court explained “it is clear that the monuments . . . 
represent government speech” because “the City has ‘effectively 
controlled’ the messages sent by the monuments in the Park by 
exercising ‘final approval authority’ over their selection.”221 Given 
that the government decided which monuments “it wants to 
display for the purpose of presenting the image of the City that it 
wishes to project to all who frequent the Park,” the message 
about its image was government speech.222  
                                                                                                     
concern with the identity of the literal speaker. Specifically, Judge Michael 
rejected a government “control” test because “this argument overlooks the fact 
that continuing transparency is essential to accountability” and “the identity of 
the speaker of the Choose Life message is likely to be unclear to viewers of the 
license plate.” Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 798–99 
(4th Cir. 2004). 
 218. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 578 (2005) (Souter, J., 
dissenting). 
 219. See ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 387 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(Martin, J., dissenting) (“The government speech doctrine, as it is used in 
Johanns, is more appropriately utilized in the compelled subsidy context, where 
who is speaking is determinative, and if it is the government, consistent with its 
broad taxing authority, that speech is immune from First Amendment 
challenge.”). Contrary to Judge Martin’s suggestion, Johanns—at least when 
read in conjunction with Summum—is “a watershed First Amendment case” 
and not simply “a watershed compelled subsidy case.” Id. at 387 n.12.  
 220. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 472–73 (2009) 
(describing the level of control that the government exercised over the 
monuments). 
 221. Id. (quoting Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560–61).  
 222. Id. at 473.  
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B. Wooley Precluded the Government’s Compelling Speech 
Through Standard Issue Plates but Did Not Address Whether 
Specialty Plates Are Government Speech or Private Speech 
The Court’s rejection of the literal speaker test helps to 
illustrate why Wooley v. Maynard223 does not support the Fourth, 
Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits’ conclusions that specialty 
plates are private speech.224 In White, the Seventh Circuit 
invoked Wooley to show that specialty plates are not government 
speech: “[I]f messages on license plates implicated no private-
speech interests at all, then Wooley (among other cases) would 
have come out differently.”225 Prior to Summum, this rigid 
separation between a government message and a private message 
may have been reasonable. Post-Summum, however, it is a false 
dichotomy.226 Under Summum and Johanns, a third party’s 
perception (or misperception) that a vehicle owner is conveying a 
message through a license plate may be relevant to a compelled 
speech claim,227 but it does not determine whether the 
government is speaking. Under Summum, a driver may seek to 
convey a message by displaying a specialty plate just as a 
monument donor or a painter may seek to convey a message 
through her donation and artwork, respectively.228 The 
government speech doctrine, though, enables the government to 
speak and convey its own message through the license plate, 
monument, or artwork: “the thoughts or sentiments expressed by 
                                                                                                     
 223. 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
 224. Infra notes 233–39 and accompanying text. 
 225. Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 862 (7th Cir. 2008); see also 
Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 
288 F.3d 610, 621 (4th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he Supreme Court has indicated [in 
Wooley] that license plates, even when owned by the government, implicate 
private speech interests because of the connection of any message on the plate to 
the driver or owner of the vehicle.” (citing Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717)). 
 226. See infra notes 227–40 and accompanying text (analyzing the difficulty 
of separating government and private messages).  
 227. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 568 (2005) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing compelled speech claims). 
 228. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470–71 (2009) 
(discussing government- and privately financed and donated monuments that 
the government accepts and displays to the public on government property). 
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a government entity that accepts and displays such an object may 
be quite different from those of either its creator or its donor.”229  
In Wooley, the Court found that the message “Live Free or 
Die” was the government’s message and that the statute required 
the Maynards to “use their private property as a ‘mobile 
billboard’ for the state’s ideological message—or suffer a 
penalty.”230 Although an observer might attribute a message to 
the driver, the government violated the First Amendment 
because it controlled the license plate process (from owning the 
license plate to selecting the message) and forced citizens to carry 
its message.231 The constitutional violation in Wooley, therefore, 
was that the government compelled the Maynards to express the 
government’s message.232 
In the specialty plate context, the circuit courts do not—and 
cannot—rely on the Supreme Court’s compelled speech cases 
because states do not require anyone to purchase and display 
specialty plates.233 Wooley did not hold that the message on the 
New Hampshire license plate was the message of the Maynards; 
rather, the Court maintained that a private individual cannot be 
forced to involuntarily carry a government message.234 The Court 
did not suggest that the plate involved private speech or 
discriminated against opposing viewpoints and, therefore, did not 
                                                                                                     
 229. Id. at 476; see also id. at 476 n.5 (“Museums display works of art that 
express many different sentiments, and the significance of a donated work of art 
to its creator or donor may differ markedly from a museum’s reasons for 
accepting and displaying the work.”). 
 230. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (emphasis added). 
 231. See id. (“Here . . . we are faced with a state measure which forces an 
individual, as part of his daily life . . . to be an instrument for fostering public 
adherence to [the government’s] ideological point of view [that the individual] 
finds unacceptable.”). 
 232. See id. (discussing how the “State ‘invades the sphere of intellect and 
spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to 
reserve from all official control’” (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 
319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943))). 
 233. License Plates & Placards, DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, 
www.dmv.org/license-plates.php (last visited Oct. 4, 2013) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 234. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 716 (concluding that the State of New 
Hampshire may not require the Maynards to display the state motto on their 
license plates).  
“KILL THE SEA TURTLES” 135 
require New Hampshire to stop using (or even to modify) the 
“Live Free or Die” plate.235 Accordingly, the Court struck down 
only the part of the statute that prohibited covering up the motto 
because that provision “requires that [the Maynards] use their 
private property as a ‘mobile billboard’ for the State’s ideological 
message.”236 Unlike the standard issue plate in Wooley, states 
do not compel anyone to purchase and display specialty license 
plates. Instead, motorists consent to be “the courier for [the 
government’s] message.”237 Thus, Wooley implicitly acknowledges 
what Summum subsequently confirms—that the government can 
speak for itself even though private parties may also engage in 
speech activity.238 Where, as in Wooley, the government compels 
others to speak, the First Amendment prevents such coercion.239 
But the government is still permitted to speak through drivers 
who are willing to keep Live Free or Die uncovered on their 
standard issue plates.240 
In fact, if Wooley applies at all, it supports the argument of 
states requiring legislative approval of specialty plates that such 
plates are government speech. If the government is speaking, 
then private citizens do not have a heckler’s veto. Private citizens 
cannot compel the government to carry their desired message any 
more than the government can force motorists—like the 
Maynards in Wooley—to carry its preferred message. That is, 
                                                                                                     
 235. See id. at 713 (defining the issue as whether the state may 
constitutionally require an individual to participate in the dissemination of a 
state message).  
 236. Id. at 715 (emphasis added). 
 237. Id. at 717. 
 238. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 468 (2009) (“A 
government entity may exercise this same freedom to express its views when it 
receives assistance from private sources for the purpose of delivering a 
government-controlled message.”). 
 239. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (“The First 
Amendment protects the right of individuals to hold a point of view different 
from the majority and refuse to foster, in the way New Hampshire commands 
[by requiring drivers to display the Live Free or Die license plates], an idea they 
find morally objectionable.”). 
 240. See id. at 713 (holding that the government cannot require drivers to 
keep the “Live Free or Die” uncovered, but not extending the ruling to prohibit 
the slogan on the standard issue plates). 
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when speaking, the government “may also decide ‘what not to 
say.’”241  
But Wooley does not apply.242 Unlike the “Live Free or Die” 
plate in Wooley, specialty plates “are privately financed and 
donated [to] government[s] . . . for public display on government 
[property],” namely the state-owned license plate.243 Motorists 
voluntarily choose to display the state’s message on their vehicles 
and are willing to pay for the opportunity to do so. In SCV, the 
Fourth Circuit suggests that it is “curious” that, if the 
government were speaking, the government would require a 
commitment from a certain number of drivers before making its 
message available through a specialty plate.244 The additional 
fee suggests to the Fourth and Ninth Circuits that the “purpose” 
of the specialty plate program is to raise revenue, not to 
promulgate a government-controlled message.245 Thus, on this 
view, the government’s purpose is to create a forum for private 
speech from which it secures additional revenue. The government 
is not seeking to “subsidiz[e] the promulgation of government-
chosen messages”246 like it did through the subsidy program in 
Rust.247 Consequently, specialty plates are not government 
speech for these circuits. 
                                                                                                     
 241. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 
573 (1995) (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 
1, 16 (1986) (plurality opinion)). 
 242. Infra notes 243–47 and accompanying text. 
 243. Summum, 555 U.S. at 461.  
 244. See Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of 
Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 620 (4th Cir. 2002) (“If the General Assembly 
intends to speak, it is curious that it requires the guaranteed collection of a 
designated amount of money from private persons before its ‘speech’ is 
triggered.”). 
 245. See id. at 620 (“It is not the case, in other words, that the special plate 
program only incidentally produces revenue for the Commonwealth. The very 
structure of the program ensures that only special plate messages popular 
enough among private individuals to produce a certain amount of revenue will 
be expressed.”); Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 966 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(“The revenue raising purpose of the Arizona special organization plate program 
supports a finding of private speech.”). 
 246. Sons of Confederate Veterans, 288 F.3d at 620 n.8. 
 247. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 178–81 (1991) (describing the Title 
X subsidy program that promulgated government messages about family 
planning). 
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As Summum demonstrates, though, the majority’s reliance 
on the extra fee requirement is misplaced. “By accepting 
monuments that are privately funded or donated, government 
entities save tax dollars and are able to acquire monuments that 
they could not have afforded to fund on their own.”248 The 
additional charge for a specialty plate ensures that the costs of 
production and distribution are covered before manufacturing 
the plate (while in many states raising money for specific 
causes that the states support). Illinois’s specialty plate statute 
expressly makes this point:  
The Secretary of State shall not issue a series of special plates 
unless applications . . . have been received for 10,000 plates of 
that series; except that the Secretary of State may prescribe 
some other required number of applications if that number is 
sufficient to pay for the total cost of designing, manufacturing 
and issuing the special license plate.249 
In this way, states can promote a variety of messages that they 
might not otherwise have the resources to fund. In addition, the 
state is able to raise additional funds to support groups with 
activities that are consistent with the states’ chosen messages. 
The fact that individuals are willing to pay for the privilege 
of carrying the government’s message (or of displaying that 
message for their own purposes) does not convert government 
speech into private speech.250 As the Court explained in 
Summum, “[a] government entity may exercise this same 
freedom to express its views when it receives assistance from 
private sources for the purpose of delivering a government-
                                                                                                     
 248. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 471 (2009). 
 249. 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-600(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 250. The Fourth Circuit invoked Rosenberger to support its claim that 
specialty plate programs create fora in which the government cannot 
discriminate based on viewpoint: “‘When the government targets . . . particular 
views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First Amendment is 
all the more blatant.’” Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 
797 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 
515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)). Rosenberger is inapplicable, however, because in that 
case, unlike the specialty plate context, the government expressly disclaimed 
that it was speaking. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 835. As the University of Virginia 
put it, student groups were “not the University’s agents, [were] not subject to its 
control, and [were] not its responsibility.” Id. 
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controlled message.”251 That third-party volunteers agree with 
the state’s message and are willing to assist the state in getting 
out its message does not mean the state has created a forum for 
private speech; rather, it demonstrates that the state has adopted 
a message that appeals to some segment of its population: “There 
is nothing in the Supreme Court’s decisions in Rust or Johanns 
that implies that the government has less right to control 
expressions of its policies when it relies on unpaid private 
people. No constitutionally significant distinction exists between 
volunteer disseminators and paid disseminators.”252  
Under Rust, a state’s specialty plate program would be 
constitutional if the state paid vehicle owners to carry a “Choose 
Life” or “Save the Sea Turtles” plate. Under Summum, the 
constitutional analysis is the same where those same vehicle 
owners volunteer—or agree to pay more—to carry the 
government’s message.253 Nor is this surprising given that the 
government speech doctrine is triggered by the level of 
government control over the message and not the source of the 
funding for that message. In the monument context, the 
government can intend to send—and actually send—a message 
through its monuments even though it is not able or willing to 
expend its own funds to do so.254 For example, a city might want 
to erect a monument to honor its veterans but may be unwilling 
or unable to pay for the monument. If private citizens raise 
sufficient funds and submit a design that is acceptable to the city, 
the city is free to accept and display that monument without 
losing the protection of the government speech doctrine: “Indeed, 
when a privately donated memorial is funded by many small 
donations, the donors themselves may differ in their 
interpretation of the monument’s significance. By accepting such 
                                                                                                     
 251. Summum, 555 U.S. at 468; see also Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 
544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005) (explaining that where the government controls the 
message, “it is not precluded from relying on the government-speech doctrine 
merely because it solicits assistance from nongovernmental sources”).  
 252. ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 378 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 253. See Summum, 555 U.S. at 468 (drawing no distinction between private 
and public funding of speech controlled by the government).  
 254. See id. at 474 (“The City’s actions . . . signify[] to all Park visitors that 
the City intends the [privately funded] monument to speak on its behalf.”). 
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a monument, a government entity does not necessarily endorse 
the specific meaning that any particular donor sees in the 
monument.”255 Rather, the city “select[s] those monuments that it 
wants to display for the purpose of presenting the image of the 
City that it wishes to project to all who frequent the Park.”256 
The same is true for specialty license plates. Under the 
Supreme Court’s government speech cases, organizations and 
individuals can propose specialty plates for their own reasons.257 
If legislation is required to approve the plate, the state exercises 
effective control and veto power over the message and, therefore, 
can authorize specialty plates to convey its intended message.258 
Under Johanns and Summum, the government has this authority 
even though (reasonable) third parties might not identify the 
government as the speaker (and thereby incorrectly attribute no 
message to the government) or misunderstand the government’s 
intended message.259 Consequently, the identity of the speaker as 
perceived by a third party is the wrong lens through which to 
see if the message is government or private speech.  
A quick review of Summum might provide support for the 
literal speaker test. The Court identifies public accountability as 
one of the main checks on government speech: “a government 
entity is ultimately ‘accountable to the electorate and the political 
process for its advocacy.’”260 As the Fourth Circuit explained in 
SCV, “where the government itself is responsible, and therefore 
accountable, for the message that its speech sends, the danger 
ordinarily involved in governmental viewpoint-based choices is 
not present.”261 To hold the government accountable, so the 
                                                                                                     
 255. Id. at 476–77. 
 256. Id. at 473. 
 257. See supra note 249 and accompanying text (discussing the ability of 
organizations and individuals to propose specialty license plates in Illinois). 
 258. See supra notes 249–51 and accompanying text (discussing legislation 
about specialty plates). 
 259. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 476 (2009) 
(discussing the difficulties of identifying a monument’s exact message and 
speaker). 
 260. Id. at 468 (quoting Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. 
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000)). 
 261. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of Motor 
Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 618 (4th Cir. 2002); see also Planned Parenthood of S.C. 
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argument goes, the electorate must be able to know that the 
government is speaking.262 As the Fourth Circuit noted in Rose, 
“the State’s advocacy of the pro-life viewpoint may not be readily 
apparent to those who see the Choose Life plate, and this 
insulates the State’s advocacy from electoral accountability.”263  
Consequently, in the absence of Johanns and the rest of the 
Summum decision, the literal speaker test is a facially 
plausible—even reasonable—way to demarcate government 
speech from private speech. As discussed above, however, 
Johanns and Summum prohibit courts from limiting the 
government speech doctrine to situations in which a reasonable 
observer would know that the government is speaking.264 After 
all, in Johanns, a reasonable observer would have thought that a 
third party—and not the government—was speaking.265 
Moreover, Wooley does not alter the analysis. Specialty plates do 
not implicate compelled speech; rather, they display to the world 
a government message through volunteers who pay for the 
privilege to carry that message. 
C. The Literal Speaker Test Fails to Account For the Fact that 
Government Speech May Have Many Meanings to Many 
Different People 
Given Johann’s and Summum’s emphasis on the 
government’s control over the message,266 the literal speaker test 
                                                                                                     
Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 795–96 (4th Cir. 2004) (“The government speech 
doctrine was not intended to authorize cloaked advocacy that allows the State to 
promote an idea without being accountable to the political process.”). 
 262. See Sons of Confederate Veterans, 288 F.3d at 618 (discussing the need 
to know when the government is “speaking”). 
 263. Rose, 361 F.3d at 795. 
 264. Supra Part III.A. 
 265. See ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 377 (6th Cir. 2006) 
Johanns also says that a government-crafted message is government 
speech even if the government does not explicitly credit itself as the 
speaker. . . . In contrast, the medium in this case, a government-
issued license plate that every reasonable person knows to be 
government-issued, a fortiori conveys a government message. 
 266. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467–68 (2009) 
(emphasizing the government’s control over the message); Johanns v. Livestock 
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concentrates on the wrong person in the communicative 
process—the listener instead of the government speaker. This 
shift in focus undermines the government’s ability to say what it 
wants. Whenever a reasonable observer improperly interprets a 
specialty plate as conveying a message on behalf of the driver, 
the government loses its right to regulate the speech on its 
specialty plates. What the literal speaker test overlooks is the 
fact that government speech may convey more than one 
message: “the thoughts or sentiments expressed by a 
government entity that accepts and displays [a monument] 
may be quite different from those of either its creator or its 
donor.”267 Under Summum, the government does not lose the 
protection of the government speech doctrine simply because a 
private person assists the government in creating or 
disseminating its message and, at the same time, seeks to engage 
in expressive activity.268 “When, as here, the government sets the 
overall message to be communicated and approves every word that is 
disseminated, it is not precluded from relying on the government-
speech doctrine merely because it solicits assistance from 
nongovernmental sources in developing specific messages.”269  
Individuals and organizations may donate monuments to 
convey “specific messages” that they want to communicate to 
others.270 The key is that the government can adopt such 
monuments for its own purposes.271 If a state has effective control 
over the speech—in other words, sets the overall message and 
approves every word conveyed—the speech is government 
speech.272 This is true, even though the individuals who proposed 
                                                                                                     
Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 560 (2005) (same). 
 267. Summum, 555 U.S. at 476. 
 268. See id. at 468 (“A government entity may exercise this same freedom to 
express its views when it receives assistance from private sources for the 
purpose of delivering a government-controlled message.”). 
 269. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 562. 
 270. See Summum, 555 U.S. at 464 (giving an example of a private group 
donating monuments to place in a city park). 
 271. See id. at 473–74 (providing an example of a city taking ownership of a 
privately donated monument displayed in the city’s park). 
 272. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 560 (giving one 
example of government speech).  
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the specialty license plate may intend to send their own, different 
message. Moreover, reasonable observers may interpret such 
monuments in even more and varied ways: “Even when a 
monument features the written word, the monument may be 
intended to be interpreted, and may in fact be interpreted by 
different observers, in a variety of ways.”273  
For example, in Van Orden v. Perry,274 the Fraternal Order of 
Eagles commissioned a Ten Commandments monument to draw 
attention to child delinquency.275 The State of Texas adopted the 
monument to convey its own message: “Texas has treated its 
Capitol grounds monuments as representing the several strands 
in the State’s political and legal history. The inclusion of the Ten 
Commandments monument in this group has a dual significance, 
partaking of both religion and government.”276 Although Texas 
did not have a statutorily prescribed program, it had approved 
“17 monuments and 21 historical markers commemorating the 
‘people, ideals, and events that compose Texan identity.’”277 These 
thirty-eight monuments and markers were designed and donated 
by various groups, but the government selected those that 
conveyed the message that the government wanted to send about 
Texas political and legal history.278 Reasonable observers could 
interpret the Fraternal Order of Eagles monument as sending 
various messages, including a religious message.279 Yet, despite 
there being a variety of possible interpretations of the 
                                                                                                     
 273. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 474 (2009). 
 274. 545 U.S. 677 (2005). 
 275. Id. at 681–82. 
 276. Id. at 691–92. 
 277. Id. at 681.  
 278. See id. at 702 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[The setting and monuments] 
communicate[] to visitors that the State sought to reflect moral principles, 
illustrating a relation between ethics and law that the State’s citizens, 
historically speaking, have endorsed.”).  
 279. See id. at 718 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
In choosing to display this version of the Commandments, Texas tells 
the observer that the State supports this side of the doctrinal 
religious debate. The reasonable observer, after all, has no way of 
knowing that this text was the product of compromise, or that there is 
a rationale of any kind for the text’s selection. 
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monument,280 for First Amendment purposes the monuments 
were government speech even though Texas did not adopt each 
monument as part of a specific program like Title X (Rust)281 or 
beef advertisements (Johanns).282 
The same analysis applies in the specialty license plate 
context. Through their specialty plate programs, states select 
those specialty plates “that portray what [government 
decisionmakers] view as appropriate for the [state], taking into 
account such content-based factors as esthetics, history, and 
local culture.”283 States that retain effective control over their 
specialty plates adopt only those specialty plates that convey 
something about the states that their legislatures think is 
appropriate for “presenting the image of the [state] that it wishes 
to project to all who” see the specialty license plates—which, 
given the mobility of people today, are seen in States across the 
country.284 By approving many different plates, states convey a 
message about the things that make it unique and special—from 
the diversity of its citizens’ interests and their educational 
backgrounds to the causes that the state supports: organ 
donation, military service, wildlife conservation, proper 
treatment of animals, education (for example, collegiate plates, 
Kids First), civic groups (for example, Kiwanis, Knights of 
Columbus, Oasis Temple, and Lion’s Club), sports (for example, 
professional football, basketball, and hockey as well as NASCAR 
plates), wildlife conservation (for example, Save the Sea Turtles, 
Coastal Federation, State Parks, Trout Unlimited), recreational 
opportunities (for example, golf, tennis, skiing, ocean, and 
mountains), and the arts.285  
                                                                                                     
 280. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 474–75 (2009) 
(considering the numerous possible messages that observers might attribute to 
the Greco-Roman mosaic of the word “Imagine” that was donated to New York 
City’s Central Park). 
 281. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 178–81 (1991) (describing the Title 
X subsidy program adopted by the government). 
 282. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 560 (2005) 
(describing the beef advertisement program as effectively controlled by the 
government). 
 283. Summum, 555 U.S. at 472.  
 284. Id. at 473.  
 285. See, e.g., Charitable & Collegiate Plates, DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES: ST. 
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At least under specialty plate programs that require 
legislative approval, states retain power over the message on 
each plate by “exercis[ing] editorial control over [proposed 
specialty plates] through prior submission requirements, design 
input, requested modifications, written criteria, and legislative 
approvals of specific content proposals.”286 The specialty plates, 
therefore, are government speech: “The [specialty plates] that 
are accepted, therefore, are meant to convey and have the 
effect of conveying a government message, and they thus 
constitute government speech.”287 As a result, under Johanns and 
Summum,288 specialty plates are exempt from scrutiny under the 
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. 
D. States Can Invoke the Government Speech Doctrine Even if 
Their Specialty Plate Programs Do Not Promulgate a Narrowly 
Defined Program or Message 
The circuit courts that take specialty plates to be private 
speech try to avoid this result by arguing that specialty plates do 
not qualify as the type of “program” protected by the government 
speech doctrine: “Thus, because South Carolina has not created a 
program ‘of the kind recognized in Rust,’ it cannot justify the Act 
as ‘necessary to define the scope and contours’ of the license plate 
scheme.”289 These circuit courts impermissibly seek to limit the 
government speech doctrine to speech directed at a specific, 
narrowly defined program or message. On this view, Rust is a 
government speech case involving a federal program that 
promoted family planning but not abortion services.290 The 
                                                                                                     
OF NEV., www.dmvnv.com/platescharitable.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2013) 
(listing several charitable and collegiate causes and plates available in the State 
of Nevada) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 286. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 472 (2009).  
 287. Id.  
 288. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 567 (2005) 
(affording no basis to a First Amendment challenge); Summum, 555 U.S. at 481 
(same). 
 289. Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 798 (4th Cir. 
2004) (quoting Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 547 (2001)). 
 290. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 178–79 (1991) (describing the Title 
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government could require funding recipients to use the money 
only for the specific program set forth in Title X.291 Similarly, 
Johanns involved government speech because the “Beef. It’s 
What’s for Dinner” campaign was created as part of a statutorily 
prescribed program to promote the marketing and consumption of 
beef products.292 Because specialty plate programs allegedly do 
not convey a specific message on behalf of the states, they do not 
qualify as government speech. 
The attempt to restrict government speech to narrowly 
defined programs fails for at least two reasons. First, a “specific 
program” requirement is inconsistent with Summum.293 In 
Summum, the government did not espouse a specific message 
along the lines of the programs in Rust or Johanns.294 Second, 
contrary to the Seventh and Eighth Circuits’ suggestion,295 a 
state does not forfeit its role as speaker simply by offering a 
variety of specialty plates. As the Sixth Circuit acknowledged in 
Bredesen, “there is nothing implausible about the notion that 
Tennessee would use its license plate program to convey 
messages regarding over one hundred groups, ideologies, 
activities, and colleges. Government in this age is large and 
involved in practically every aspect of life.”296 States can use 
their specialty plate programs to convey an overall image of 
the state by highlighting different aspects of the state that the 
                                                                                                     
X subsidy program that promulgated government messages about family 
planning programs that did not include abortion). 
 291. See id. (“[Title X] provides that ‘[n]one of the funds appropriated under 
this subchapter shall be used in programs where abortion is a method of family 
planning.’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (2012))).  
 292. See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 554 (describing the promotional projects 
authorized by the Beef Act including the familiar trademarked slogan “Beef. It’s 
What’s for Dinner”). 
 293. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 464–86 (2009) 
(discussing the city’s right to select monuments for a public park without ever 
mentioning a “specific program” requirement). 
 294. See id. at 477 (noting that the message conveyed by a monument may 
evolve over time).  
 295. See, e.g., Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 868 (8th Cir. 2009) (“With 
more than 200 specialty plates available to Missouri vehicle owners, a 
reasonable observer could not think that the State of Missouri communicates all 
those messages.”).  
 296. ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 376 (6th Cir. 2006). 
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legislature wants to celebrate. A state need not subsidize a 
specific program (such as Title X in Rust)297 or promulgate a 
narrowly defined message (such as “Beef. It’s What’s for 
Dinner”)298 to fall within the government speech doctrine. After 
all, in Summum, the city had a wide range of monuments—for 
example, a wishing well, September 11 monument, fire station, 
granary, and the Ten Commandments monument—yet retained 
the protection of the government speech doctrine.299 The central 
point for the Court was that the “City has selected those 
monuments that it wants to display for the purpose of presenting 
the image of the City that it wishes to project to all who frequent 
the Park.”300  
The Court never has imposed a narrow “program” 
requirement under the government speech doctrine even though 
the government certainly can and does speak through specific 
programs. This is apparent from Hurley.301 In Hurley, a group of 
gay, lesbian, and bisexual descendants of Irish immigrants 
sought to march as a group in Boston’s St. Patrick’s Day 
parade.302 After the private organizers of the parade denied their 
request, the group sued, contending that the exclusion of the 
group violated Massachusetts’s public accommodation law.303 A 
unanimous Court held that the First Amendment protected the 
organizers’ right to exclude a group that would “impart[] a 
message the organizers do not wish to convey.”304 Given that 
parades are expressive activities, the organizers could claim the 
“fundamental rule of protection under the First Amendment, that 
a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own 
message.”305 And this is true even if the speaker does not convey 
                                                                                                     
 297. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 178–79 (1991) (describing the 
government subsidized Title X program). 
 298. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 555 (2005). 
 299. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 464–65 (2009). 
 300. Id. at 473. 
 301. 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
 302. See id. at 572 (“[T]he disagreement goes to the admission of GLIB as its 
own parade unit carrying its own banner.”). 
 303. See id. at 572–73 (discussing GLIB’s grounds for the litigation). 
 304. Id. at 559.  
 305. Id. at 573.  
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a particularized message: “A speaker does not forfeit 
constitutional protection simply by combining multifarious voices, 
or by failing to edit their themes to isolate an exact message as 
the exclusive subject matter of the speech.”306 The parade 
organizers in Hurley were “rather lenient in admitting 
participants.”307 But they still were protected by the First 
Amendment because “a narrow, succinctly articulated message is 
not a condition of constitutional protection, which if confined to 
expressions conveying a ‘particularized message’ would never 
reach the unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, 
music of Arnold Schöenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis 
Carroll.”308  
Like the parade organizers in Hurley, states select those 
specialty plates that taken together convey a message about each 
state. And “since every participating unit affects the message 
conveyed,” those who have messages that are not approved 
cannot “requir[e states] to alter the expressive content of their 
[program].”309 When speaking, states retain the right to say what 
they want on certain topics and to remain silent on others:  
Rather like a composer, the Council selects the expressive 
units of the parade from potential participants, and though the 
score may not produce a particularized message, each 
contingent’s expression in the Council’s eyes comports with 
what merits celebration on that day. Even if this view gives 
the Council credit for a more considered judgment than it 
actively made, the Council clearly decided to exclude a 
message it did not like from the communication it chose to 
make, and that is enough to invoke its right as a private 
speaker to shape its expression by speaking on one subject 
while remaining silent on another.310 
As Summum confirms, under the government speech doctrine a 
state has “the choice . . . not to propound a particular point of 
view,”311 which means it can exclude viewpoints that conflict with 
                                                                                                     
 306. Id. at 569–70.  
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 308. Id. (citation omitted). 
 309. Id. at 572–73. 
 310. Id. at 574.  
 311. Id. at 575. 
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its vision of “what merits celebration”312 about the state.313 The 
fact that a state adopts “expressive units” (in other words, 
particular specialty plates that individuals or groups propose and 
pay for) relating to the people, history, sports, and natural beauty 
of that state does not cause it to lose the protection of the 
government speech doctrine. As the Court explains in Johanns, 
“[w]hen, as here, the government sets the overall message to be 
communicated and approves every word that is disseminated,” a 
state does not relinquish First Amendment protection “merely 
because it solicits assistance from nongovernmental sources in 
developing specific messages.”314 Thus, because states, like the 
parade organizers in Hurley, (i) establish the message and 
(ii) have effective control over the content and dissemination of 
the message, states’ specialty plate programs constitute 
government speech.315 
Furthermore, the fact that some (reasonable) observers may 
attribute a message—“Save the Sea Turtles,” “Choose Life,” 
“Tobacco Heritage,” or any other specialty plate—to the vehicle 
owner and not the state does not move the state outside the 
government speech doctrine. Although many (perhaps most) 
viewers thought a private beef association sponsored the “Beef. 
It’s What’s for Dinner” campaign, the speech still was 
                                                                                                     
 312. Id. at 574. 
 313. See id. at 573–74 (stating that the point of “this general rule, that the 
speaker has the right to tailor the speech, . . . is to shield just those choices of 
content that in someone’s eyes are misguided, or even hurtful”). 
 314. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005) (emphasis 
added); see also Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 
U.S. 557, 570 (1995) (“Nor, under our precedent, does First Amendment 
protection require a speaker to generate, as an original matter, each item 
featured in the communication.”). 
 315. Even in the funding context, the Court does not limit the government 
speech doctrine to narrowly defined programs. As Legal Services Corp. v. 
Velazquez explains, the government can avail itself of the government speech 
doctrine whenever it is speaking, not only when it decides to use private 
speakers to advance specific programs: “We have said that viewpoint-based 
funding decisions can be sustained in instances in which the government is 
itself the speaker . . . or in instances, like Rust, in which the government ‘used 
private speakers to transmit specific information pertaining to its own 
programs.’” 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (citation omitted). 
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government speech.316 Similarly, the government is speaking 
through its specialty plates even though “[t]hose who see the 
Choose Life plate displayed on vehicles, and fail to see a 
comparable pro-choice plate, are likely to assume that the 
presence of one plate and the absence of another are the result of 
popular choice.”317 States, such as North Carolina, Missouri, and 
Texas, may offer more than 100 specialty plates but that does 
not change the fact that the state controls the entire process for 
each specialty plate and selects only those plates “that portray 
what they view as appropriate for” each state.318 By approving 
many different plates, these states send a message about the 
things they want to celebrate about their state and citizens—be 
that education, sports, recreation, civic organizations, military 
service, arts, environmental issues, and the list goes on.  
In addition, Summum’s recognition that those who display or 
view the government’s speech may interpret that message 
differently undermines Judge Martin’s claim in his Bredesen 
dissent that Tennessee’s specialty plate program promotes speech 
that appears difficult, if not impossible, to attribute to the 
state.319 To use Judge Martin’s example, Tennessee offers 
specialty plates with the emblems of a variety of universities and 
colleges, including the University of Tennessee and the 
University of Florida.320 These school specialty plates enable 
motorists to show their pride in or support for particular schools. 
Contrary to Judge Martin’s claim, though, these college plates 
do not send inconsistent messages. In offering a variety of 
school license plates, Tennessee does not advocate one school 
over another, even though individuals choosing a specific 
                                                                                                     
 316. See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 564–65 (holding that the slogan is 
government speech even though viewers may have attributed the slogan to 
private companies).  
 317. Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 798 (4th Cir. 
2004) 
 318. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 472 (2009). 
 319. ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 382 n.4 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(Martin, J., dissenting). 
 320. See id. at 382 n.5 (listing the various universities and organizations 
that have specialty plates in Tennessee). 
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college plate might do so.321 Rather, by approving specialty 
plates for many colleges and universities, Tennessee conveys a 
message about its diverse, well-educated citizens and, at the 
same time, champions the various educational opportunities that 
Tennessee offers its citizens.322 That a third party might see a 
Florida specialty plate and think the vehicle owner likes 
Florida does not change the fact that the state formally 
adopted the plate to send its own, albeit different, message 
about Tennessee—that Tennessee has well-educated citizens and 
is proud of its various institutions of higher learning. 
Under Johanns and Summum, states may convey their 
desired messages—“Choose Life” or “Save the Sea Turtles”—if 
they have “effective[] control[]” and “final approval authority” 
over the content and selection of specialty license plates.323 
States that require statutory action for specialty plates have 
such control over the images and wording that appear on their 
specialty plates.324 And, just as the legislatures can create new 
specialty plates through statute, they can revoke or amend any 
specialty plate by passing new legislation. Thus, these states 
have the same level of control over specialty plates that local 
governments exercise over monument selection, “generally 
exercis[ing] editorial control over [specialty plates] through prior 
submission requirements, design input, requested modifications, 
                                                                                                     
 321. Under the literal speaker test adopted by several circuit courts, the 
purpose of the specialty plate program is to permit private expression in a 
designated forum. See Ariz. Life Coal. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 965 (9th Cir. 
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 323. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 560–61 (2005). 
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written criteria, and legislative approvals of specific content 
proposals.”325 The First Amendment, therefore, protects the 
states’ right to issue a “Save the Sea Turtles” or “Choose Life” 
plate without offering plates that express alternative 
viewpoints.326 
IV. The Literal Speaker Test Also Violates Summum Because it 
Forces States to Either Allow a Cacophony of Speech with 
Which They Disagree, or to Terminate Their Specialty Plate 
Programs Altogether 
Given that most of the circuit courts decided their 
specialty license plate cases pre-Summum, they did not have 
the opportunity to consider an independent basis for the 
Court’s decision.327 In a section of Summum that has received 
scarce attention to date, the Court states that where “public 
forum principles . . . are out of place in the context of [a] case,” 
it will not apply its forum doctrine.328 The Court has applied its 
forum doctrine in situations in which “government-owned 
property or a government program was capable of 
accommodating a large number of public speakers without 
defeating the essential function of the land or the program.”329 
Thus, a forum analysis is appropriate for speeches and parades 
in parks, the Combined Federal Campaign,330 a student 
                                                                                                     
 325. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 472 (2009); see also 
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 330. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 
804–05 (1985) (determining whether a charity drive aimed at federal employees 
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activity fund at a university,331 meetings in public buildings,332 
and a school’s internal mail facility.333  
But this analysis does not govern monuments in public 
parks. In Summum, the park could “accommodate only a limited 
number of permanent monuments” given its size.334 While a park 
can host many speakers and demonstrations over time, it cannot 
display an unlimited number of monuments. Space runs out 
because “monuments . . . endure.”335 The Court’s concern with 
spatial limitations may, at first glance, suggest that the forum 
analysis should apply in the specialty plate context. Specialty 
plates can accommodate a large variety of special interest 
messages, as evidenced by states’ offering hundreds of such plates 
to vehicle owners.336 Although this argument has facial appeal, 
the Court expressly stated that its forum analysis does not apply 
when the proffered private speech would undermine the 
government’s proposed message regardless of whether that 
speech is undertaken through government-owned property or a 
government-sponsored program.337 Where, as in a specialty plate 
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 331. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 
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 332. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274–75 (1981) (noting that an 
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 335. Id. 
 336. In American Civil Liberties Union of N.C. v. Conti, now pending in the 
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Cir. Oct. 30, 2013). 
 337. See Summum, 555 U.S. at 473, 480 (noting that the city selected the 
monuments it wanted to display for the purpose of presenting the image of the 
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program, the private speech would interfere with the government 
program (or the use of government property for its expressive 
purposes), the forum analysis does not apply.338 
Stated differently, public forum principles are out of place 
where public access would defeat the essential function of a 
government program by forcing the government to send messages 
that conflict with its chosen message.339 Thus, even if there was 
room for the Summum monument in the Pleasant Grove City 
park, the government could decline it—and any other 
monument—if the government determined that the monument 
conflicted with the government’s intended message.340 Otherwise, 
“[e]very jurisdiction that has accepted a donated war memorial 
may be asked to provide equal treatment for a donated 
monument questioning the cause for which the veterans 
fought.”341  
The same problem arises if courts apply the Court’s forum 
analysis to specialty plate programs. The literal speaker test, 
which takes specialty plates to be private speech in a designated 
limited forum, does not provide any limiting principle to 
constrain the number and type of specialty plates that a state 
could be forced to offer: “If the government entities must 
maintain viewpoint neutrality in their selection of donated 
monuments, they must . . . ‘brace themselves for an influx of 
clutter.’”342 Instead, states are required to accept all viewpoints 
                                                                                                     
city that it wished to show, and that, generally, forum analysis does not apply in 
such a case). 
 338. See id. (noting that generally, forum analysis does not apply to the 
installation of permanent monuments on public property). 
 339. See id. at 478 (stating that public forum principles are out of place in 
the context of the case). 
 340. See id. at 472 (“The monuments that are accepted, therefore, are meant 
to convey and have the effect of conveying a government message, and they thus 
constitute government speech.”). 
 341. Id. at 480. As the Court repeatedly states in Summum, local 
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relating to any of their specialty plates.343 Under this test, once a 
state offers a “Choose Life” plate, it must offer plates expressing 
(presumably all) other viewpoints on that subject.344 What is true 
with respect to a “Choose Life” plate, though, is true for other 
specialty plates (like a Sons of Confederate Veterans plate that 
includes the image of a Confederate flag). To avoid impermissible 
discrimination under the literal speaker test, states must either 
allow opposing viewpoints on any subject covered by an existing 
specialty plate—which could lead to a flood of different plates 
advancing positions or groups with which North Carolina 
disagrees—or do away with specialty plates altogether.345  
For example, under the forum analysis used by many of the 
circuit courts, if a state offers a Veterans of Foreign Wars plate, it 
can be required to issue specialty plates questioning the cause for 
which these veterans fought.346 Given that many states have a 
longstanding relationship with the military and are home to 
various military bases, these states also issue plates honoring 
those who currently serve in various branches of the military.347 
                                                                                                     
 343. See id. at 480 (providing examples of how all viewpoints in the form of 
monuments would have to be represented). 
 344. In his concurrence in Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, Judge Manion 
contends that a “Choose Life” plate is viewpoint neutral because it presumes 
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 347. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-79.4(a2) (2012) (providing standards for 
license plates based on military service). 
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Under the court’s public forum analysis, simply offering such 
plates would force a state to issue plates criticizing the military 
or those who serve in it—sending a message that directly 
contravenes the state’s intended message.348 The state would be 
forced to promulgate a wide variety of plates that directly 
contravene its own preferred message or, at a minimum, to send 
a message with which the state does not want to be associated. 
By the same token, having issued a “Save the Sea Turtles” 
plate, which expresses the state’s concern for and pride in its 
coastal wildlife, the legislature may be asked to authorize a 
countervailing alternative, such as “Kill the Sea Turtles” or “Let 
the Sea Turtles Die.” Under the literal speaker test, when 
confronted with such an alternative, the state would have to 
accept the proposed plate (thereby promoting a message directly 
at odds with its chosen view) or do away with the “Save the Sea 
Turtles” plate.349 As the Court stated in Summum,  
On this view, when France presented the Statue of Liberty to 
the United States in 1884, this country had the option of 
either (a) declining France’s offer or (b) accepting the gift, but 
providing a comparable location in the harbor of New York for 
other statues of a similar size and nature (e.g., a Statue of 
Autocracy, if one had been offered by, say, the German Empire 
or Imperial Russia).350 
Given that states, such as North Carolina, offer a variety of 
specialty plates, including “Support Our Troops,” “Friends of the 
Great Smoky Mountains,” “In God We Trust,” “Kids First,” and 
“Tobacco Heritage,”351 applying the Court’s forum analysis would 
force these states either to allow opposing viewpoints—
“Undermine Our Troops,” “Clear-Cut the Great Smoky 
Mountains,” “In Atheism We Trust,” “Kids Last,” and “Tobacco 
                                                                                                     
 348. See Summum, 555 U.S. at 480 (“If government entities must maintain 
viewpoint neutrality . . . they must either ‘brace themselves for an influx of 
clutter’ or face the pressure to remove longstanding and cherished 
monuments.”). 
 349. See id. (noting that government entities would have to either allow all 
expressions, or none at all). 
 350. Id. at 479. 
 351. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-79.4(b) (2012) (listing the numerous and 
various specialty license plates offered). 
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Causes Cancer”—or to terminate its specialty plate program. 
Faced with a similar challenge to the content of a parade in 
Hurley, the Court upheld the speaker’s right to determine the 
content of the message:  
Under this approach any contingent of protected individuals 
with a message would have the right to participate in 
petitioners’ speech, so that the communication produced by the 
private organizers would be shaped by all those protected by 
the law who wished to join in with some expressive 
demonstration of their own. But this use of the State’s power 
violates the fundamental rule of protection under the First 
Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the 
content of his own message.352 
The threat of conflicting messages is made worse by the fact 
that there would be a number of viewpoints, and therefore a 
number of proposed specialty plates, on any given topic. For 
example, “Choose Life” and “Respect Choice” are not the only 
viewpoints on abortion and, in fact, are not even necessarily 
contradictory views in the abortion debate. Both slogans 
presuppose that “choice” is appropriate. Put differently, by 
advocating the choice of life, the state is acknowledging that the 
Constitution protects a woman’s right to choose. As Judge Manion 
put the point in his concurrence in White: 
The [Choose Life] message acknowledges both choice and life, 
so most people who claim to be pro-life and a large number of 
people who claim to be pro-choice but personally opposed to 
abortion should be comfortable with this message that is 
directed at pregnant women who are contemplating abortion. 
The petition expressly recognizes that it is the woman’s choice. 
But at the same time it recognizes that the life of the 
developing baby is also at stake.353  
Through a “Choose Life” plate, the state is promoting childbirth 
over abortion, and, in the process, admitting that there is a 
constitutionally protected choice to be made. States are allowed to 
                                                                                                     
 352. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 
573 (1995). 
 353. Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 867–68 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(Manion, J., concurring).  
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do this under Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania 
v. Casey:  
To promote the State’s profound interest in potential life, . . . 
the State may take measures to ensure that the woman’s 
choice is informed, and measures designed to advance this 
interest will not be invalidated as long as their purpose is to 
persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion.354 
If the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits are 
correct and specialty plates create a forum, then states cannot 
discriminate against any viewpoint relating to abortion.355 
Going forward, states must allow all viewpoints to be heard.356 
Consequently, even if a state wants to promote childbirth over 
abortion through its specialty plate program, its legislature 
must approve plates that express other viewpoints on abortion—
Pro-life, Pro-abortion, Anti-life, Anti-abortion, Fetuses Are 
Persons, Fetuses Are Not Persons, Fetuses are persons after 
viability, Fetuses are persons at conception, Every Child a 
Wanted Child, Every Child is a Child, and the list could go on 
and on. To avoid all of these discordant messages—messages that 
conflict with the state’s preferred “Choose Life” message—the 
state would have to shut down its specialty plate program. But as 
Summum expressly states, “where the application of forum 
analysis would lead almost inexorably to closing of the forum, it 
is obvious that forum analysis is out of place.”357  
                                                                                                     
 354. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992). 
 355. See Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 870–71 (8th Cir. 2009) (finding 
that because Missouri’s specialty plate program allowed denial of an application 
based on the organization’s viewpoint, it permitted viewpoint discrimination, 
and thus violated the First Amendment); Ariz. Life Coal. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 
956, 972 (9th Cir. 2008) (determining that the license plate Commission 
discriminated on the basis of viewpoint in violation of the First Amendment); 
White, 547 F.3d at 853 (concluding that because the rejection of the “Choose 
Life” license plate was reasonable and viewpoint neutral, there was no First 
Amendment violation); Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 
799 (4th Cir. 2004) (deciding that South Carolina engaged in viewpoint 
discrimination by distorting the forum in favor of its own pro-life view).  
 356. See Stanton, 515 F.3d at 965 (noting that Arizona is providing a forum 
in which organizations can use the specialty license plates to express their First 
Amendment rights and raise money for their organization). 
 357. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 480 (2009); see also 
Page v. Lexington Cnty. Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 2 7 5 ,  287 ( 4 t h  C i r .     
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Whether states will be flooded with requests for alternative 
viewpoints if specialty plate programs are treated as designated 
limited forums is not idle speculation under Summum. Pleasant 
Grove City expressed the same concern in Summum, and the 
Court held that the state’s “concerns are well founded.”358 
According to the Court, “[i]f government entities must maintain 
viewpoint neutrality in their selection of donated monuments, 
they must either ‘brace themselves for an influx of clutter’ or face 
the pressure to remove longstanding and cherished 
monuments.”359 The same applies to specialty license plates, as 
illustrated by the “Kill the Sea Turtles” example.  
Even if no organization has petitioned a state for a “Kill the 
Sea Turtles” plate, the threat to the government’s First 
Amendment rights is the same as in the monument context.360 In 
Summum, the Court highlighted the threat to the government’s 
ability to convey its desired message with two examples that had 
never occurred.361 In particular, the Court considered the possible 
conflicts with the government’s message that might arise if the 
forum doctrine applied and concluded that the forum doctrine, 
therefore, did not apply.362 According to the Court, “[e]very 
jurisdiction that has accepted a donated war memorial may be 
asked to provide equal treatment for a donated monument 
questioning the cause for which the veterans fought.”363 
Similarly, the Court determined that, under its forum analysis, 
                                                                                                     
2 0 0 8 ) (explaining that because “government speech almost always supports 
a given policy objective and ‘[t]he government is entitled to promote particular 
messages,’ [the government] can surely ‘take legitimate and appropriate steps 
to ensure that its message[s] [are] neither garbled nor distorted’” (quoting 
Griffin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 274 F.3d 818, 822 (4th Cir. 2001), and 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995))).  
 358. Summum¸ 555 U.S. at 479.  
 359. Id. (citation omitted).  
 360. See supra note 359 and accompanying text (discussing the threat in the 
monument context, whereby government entities would have to either maintain 
viewpoint neutrality, or brace for an influx of numerous monuments). 
 361. See Summum, 555 U.S. at 479–80 (providing the veterans monument 
and Statue of Liberty examples). 
 362. See id. at 480 (“But as a general matter, forum analysis simply does not 
apply to the installation of permanent monuments on public property.”). 
 363. Id. at 480.  
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accepting the Statue of Liberty would require the government to 
accept monuments that are inconsistent with our nation’s values:  
On this view, when France presented the Statue of Liberty 
to the United States in 1884, this country had the option of 
either (a) declining France’s offer or (b) accepting the gift, 
but providing a comparable location in the harbor of New 
York for other statues of a similar size and nature (e.g., a 
Statue of Autocracy, if one had been offered by, say, the 
German Empire or Imperial Russia).364  
The same constitutional analysis applies to specialty 
license plates. If a state honors its military and veterans of 
foreign wars with their own plates, it would have to issue 
plates “questioning the cause for which the veterans fought.”365 
The threat of a monument questioning the cause for which our 
veterans fought is as real as the threat of a specialty plate 
challenging that cause.366 That no applications for anti-
veterans or antiwar plates may have been submitted 
previously is not surprising. Given that the government 
controls the specialty plate process, no one imagined that the 
government would approve such plates. Under the literal 
speaker test, though, the government loses its control over the 
specialty plate process and, in turn, the message conveyed by 
the overall program.367 As in Summum, states would be 
required to convey messages that they disagree with and that 
contradict the images of the states that they are trying to 
promote.368 States would lose their right “to shape [their] 
expression by speaking on one subject while remaining silent 
on another.”369 Instead of promoting numerous messages that 
are inconsistent with the image of a state that its elected 
                                                                                                     
 364. Id. at 479.  
 365. Id. at 480.  
 366. See id. at 479 (noting that concerns over alternative viewpoints being 
promulgated were “well founded”). 
 367. See id. at 480 (noting that government entities would have to either 
allow all expressions, or none at all). 
 368. See id. at 479–80 (providing the veterans monument and Statute of 
Liberty examples). 
 369. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 
574 (1995).  
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representatives want to convey, states would have to shut 
down their specialty plate programs.370 
This is not to say that a state cannot create a designated 
open or designated limited forum for specialty plates. Rather, 
it is to recognize, consistent with Summum, that “[i]t certainly 
is not common for property owners to open up their property 
for the installation of permanent monuments [or specialty 
plates] that convey a message with which they do not wish to 
be associated.”371 States can create a forum for monuments on 
public property if they want to, although it would be the rare 
case: 
To be sure, there are limited circumstances in which the 
forum doctrine might properly be applied to a permanent 
monument—for example, if a town created a monument on 
which all of its residents (or all those meeting some other 
criterion) could place the name of a person to be honored or 
some other private message. But as a general matter, forum 
analysis simply does not apply to the installation of 
permanent monuments on public property.372 
Under such circumstances, a reasonable observer might 
“routinely—and reasonably—interpret [the monument] as 
conveying some message on the property owner’s behalf.”373 
But the observer would be wrong. Because the government 
relinquished its control over the monument, the government 
would lose the protection of the government speech doctrine 
even though a viewer would reasonably think that the 
government was the speaker.374 As a result, the literal speaker 
test, which is predicated on how a reasonable observer would 
interpret the alleged government speech, cannot be used 
                                                                                                     
 370. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 480 (2009) (noting 
that if all monuments were permitted, most parks would respond by refusing all 
donated monuments). 
 371. Id. at 471. 
 372. Id. at 480.  
 373. Id. at 471.  
 374. See id. at 471 (explaining that where the government has erected a 
monument in a public park “there is little chance that observers will fail to 
appreciate the identity of the speaker” as the government).  
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reliably to distinguish government and private speech under 
Summum and Johanns.375 
The same is true with respect to specialty license plates. 
Some states have created administrative procedures that 
operate like the hypothetical monument in Summum that is 
opened up for private messages and is subject to the Court’s 
forum doctrine.376 Other states have not, deciding instead to 
retain effective control and veto power over the entire 
process.377 Thus, even under Summum’s control test, some 
specialty plate programs, like those in Arizona and Missouri, 
may create a limited designated forum.378 For example, in 
Stanton, Arizona set up an administrative procedure for 
specialty plates under which “[t]he Commission[ had] de 
minimis editorial control over the plate design and color.”379 
Organizations meeting specified criteria were entitled to have 
their proposed license plates approved.380 Because the 
Commission lacked effective control over the plate and its 
message, Summum would support a finding that the state 
created a forum for private speech and, therefore, could not 
discriminate based on viewpoint.381  
Under the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuit 
opinions, though, there is no difference between a specialty 
plate program that sets up an administrative procedure (under 
which specialty plates are approved without any meaningful 
                                                                                                     
 375. See Am. Civil Liberties Union of N.C. v. Conti, 912 F. Supp. 2d 363, 
371–72 (E.D.N.C. 2012) (differentiating the speech at issue in Summum and 
Johanns from North Carolina’s specialty plate program at issue). 
 376. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 28-2404(B) (LexisNexis 2011) (outlining the 
procedure for applying for the creation of a specialty license plate). 
 377. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 563–64 (2005) (“And 
Congress, of course, retains oversight authority, not to mention the ability to 
reform the program at any time. No more is required.”). 
 378. See Ariz. Life Coal. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 971 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(“Finally, we note that the nature of the forum also supports a conclusion that 
Arizona intended only to create a limited public forum.”). 
 379. Id. at 966. 
 380. See id. at 970 (“To gain access, the nonprofit organization must have its 
application reviewed and approved by the Commission.”). 
 381. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 479 (2009) 
(describing how viewpoint neutrality would preclude the government from 
selecting which monuments it wanted to have in the park). 
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involvement or oversight by the government) and one that 
requires the state legislature to enact legislation approving the 
form and content of each new specialty plate.382 That is, the 
circuit courts fail to distinguish between programs where a 
state has minimal control and those where a state has total 
control.383 Under Summum, this distinction is critical. Just as 
there is a constitutionally significant difference between 
monuments that the government controls and those that are 
opened to the public to “place the name of a person to be 
honored or some other private message,” there is a 
constitutionally significant difference between these two types 
of specialty plate programs.384 Yet the circuit courts’ literal 
speaker test does not distinguish between the specialty plate 
programs that require legislative action and the purely 
administrative procedures that Arizona, Missouri, and other 
states employ.385 Under the literal speaker test, specialty 
plates are always associated with the vehicle owners, which 
means a state’s specialty plate program always creates a 
designated forum.386 The level of control that the government 
exercises is irrelevant.387  
The literal speaker test, therefore, contradicts the Court’s 
analysis in Summum and should be rejected because it 
prevents states and cities from “portray[ing through specialty 
plates] what they view as appropriate for the place in 
question.”388 Instead, once a state approves a specialty plate, it 
must authorize plates advancing any viewpoint on the subject 
                                                                                                     
 382. See supra note 355 and accompanying text (citing circuit court opinions 
holding that specialty plates create a forum). 
 383. See Stanton, 515 F.3d at 966 (“The Commission’s de minimis editorial 
control over the plate design and color does not support a finding that the 
messages conveyed by the organization constitute government speech.”).  
 384. Summum, 555 U.S. at 480.  
 385. See, e.g., Ariz. Life Coal. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 966–67 (9th Cir. 
2008) (describing the literal speaker test and its application). 
 386. See id. at 968 (detailing the standards of a designated public forum as 
it applied to Arizona’s “Choose Life” license plate). 
 387. See id. at 973 (noting that constitutional concerns outweigh 
government discretion in regulating speech, even in the limited public fora of 
license plate regulation). 
 388. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 472 (2009). 
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matter of the original plate (subject only to reasonable time, 
place, and manner restrictions).389 Accordingly, because 
applying the Supreme Court’s “forum analysis would lead 
almost inexorably to closing of the forum,” courts should reject 
that analysis and find that legislature-controlled specialty 
plate programs are government speech.390 
V. Conclusion 
When deciding if expressive activity is government or 
private speech, the critical consideration under Johanns and 
Summum is not whether a third party can identify the 
government as the speaker but whether the government is 
actually speaking.391 Where the government “sets the overall 
message to be communicated and approves every word that is 
disseminated”392 or “has ‘effectively controlled’ the messages 
sent . . . by exercising ‘final approval authority’ over the 
selection”393 of the message, it may claim the fundamental 
right protected by the Speech Clause—the right to choose the 
content of its message: “[T]he fundamental rule of protection 
under the First Amendment [is] that a speaker has the 
autonomy to choose the content of his own message.”394  
Contrary to the majority of circuit courts that have 
considered the constitutionality of specialty license plates, 
states that approve such plates through legislative enactment 
do exercise the requisite level of control to qualify for the 
protection of the government speech doctrine.395 In such cases, 
                                                                                                     
 389. See id. at 479 (noting that viewpoint neutrality would lead to 
government entities’ having to deal with an influx of clutter). 
 390. Id. at 480.  
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the legislature has final approval authority over the images 
and wording that appear on all specialty plates.396 And just as 
state legislatures create new specialty plates through statute, 
they can revoke or amend any specialty plate by passing new 
legislation.397 Thus, because these states exercise complete 
control over the specialty plate program, “[n]o more is 
required.”398  
Furthermore, a finding that specialty plates are private 
speech undermines a state’s right to speak for itself and 
creates a heckler’s veto. If specialty plates authorized by 
statute are private speech, states will be forced to approve a 
wide range of specialty plates that send messages in conflict 
with the states’ chosen messages.399 But as Summum expressly 
holds, “where the application of forum analysis would lead 
almost inexorably to closing of the forum, it is obvious that 
forum analysis is out of place.”400 To the extent that certain 
citizens in a state dislike the messages that the state 
promulgates through its specialty plate program, they can 
avail themselves of the primary check on government speech—
the political process: “[A] government entity is ultimately 
‘accountable to the electorate and the political process for its 
advocacy . . . . If the citizenry objects, newly elected officials 
later could espouse some different or contrary position.’”401 
What they cannot do is force the government to convey a 
message that is inconsistent with its view of the “image of the 
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 396. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-79.4 (2012) (noting that the state retains 
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[state] that it wishes to project to all who” view the specialty 
license plates.402 Under Summum, Johanns, and Hurley, a 
state need not “Kill the Sea Turtles” on its specialty plates any 
more than “Save” them. In fact, under the government speech 
doctrine, it cannot be forced to convey any message with which 
it disagrees.  
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